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BRIEF OF THE CROSS-APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction1 of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1
Whether the real property located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah qualified for
homestead exemption on April 17, 2001, when a prejudgment Writ of Attachment was issued
against the property.2 (Addendum 8, page 19, line 25; page 20, lines 1-18)

l

Timeliness of Cross-Appelants' appeal is questioned. See Addendum 15.
Although a hearing was held on March 26, 2001, on the motion for a writ of attachment,
(Addendum 1, page 126), the order granting the motion was not signed until April 16, 2001
(Addendum 4). The prejudgment Writ of Attachment was issued the following day, April 17,
2001 (Addendum 3). This is when the contingent lien of the prejudgment Writ of Attachment
was established. Miller questions the use of the phrase "judicial lien seized the property" by
Houghtons and Thomas' in their opening brief, "judicial lien" is defined in 78-23-2(4) to mean
wt
a lien on property obtained by judgment or other legal process instituted for the purpose of
collecting an unsecured debt." There was no judgment against Miller. So for this to qualify as a
"judicial lien" as defined in the statute, there must be legal process for the purpose of collecting
an unsecured debt. There was no debt, secured or unsecured, owed by Miller to Houghtons and
Thomas'. There was no debtor/creditor relationship at all between the parties prior to the
judgment granted by the trial court on April 10, 2003. The indebtedness claimed by Houghtons
and Thomas' was for promissory notes, to which Miller was not a party, that were issued by
LD&B Management, Inc. (LD&B), an entity in which Miller was neither an owner, officer, or
employee (Addendum 1, pages 504-505). Houghtons obtained a judgment against LD&B for the
amount of their promissory notes on March 13, 2000, in Third District Court, case number
990399712. On that same date, Thomas' obtained a judgment against LD&B for the amount of
their promissory notes in Third District Court, case number 990300746. Both Houghtons and
Thomas' each received a satisfaction of judgment for the amounts of these judgments. In
statements subscribed and sworn by Douglas F. White, attorney for Houghtons and Thomas',
they each acknowledged a satisfaction of their judgments. The satisfaction of judgment was
filed on September 7, 2001, in their respective cases. (See Attachments B and C of Miller's
Appellant Docketing Statement submitted in this case on January 29, 2004.) Therefore, because
no unsecured debt or judgment existed against Miller, the prejudgment writ of attachment should
not be characterized as a "judicial lien" that "seized the property."
2

1

Issue 2
Whether the declaration of homestead filed on March 27, 2003, defeated the prejudgment
Writ of Attachment issued against the real property located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah
on April 17, 2001.3(Addendum 8, page 19, line 25; page 20, lines 1-20; page 22, lines 8-13)
Standard of Review4: The standard of review in this case for the above stated issues is for
correctness of facts as well as correctness of the law. Because this is an appeal of an equity case,
"In an appeal of an equity case the [Court of Appeals] may weigh the facts as well as review the
law, but will reverse on the facts only when the evidence clearly preponderates against the
findings of the trial court." Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981). Also "[s]ince
appeal may be had on the facts as well as the law in equity cases, it is our duty, when called
upon, to weigh the facts as well as to review the law." Jensen v. Brown 639 P.2d 152 (Utah
1981).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE5
On November 25, 2000, Cross-Appellants, Jerry Houghton, Susan Houghton, Kendall R,
Thomas, Marlene Thomas, and the 1995 Thomas Family Trust (Houghtons and Thomas') filed a
complaint alleging fraud (Addendum 1, pages 1-20). Cross-Appellee, Glen E. Miller (Miller)
3

Miller has replaced "nullified the judicial lien ordered" with "defeated the prejudgment writ of
attachment issued." The word "nullified" means "invalidated." The word "defeated" means
"overcome in battle." The phrase "may defeat a prejudgment writ of attachment," was used by
the court in its legal discussion of the order issued on August 7, 2003 (Addendum 9, page 2, lines
2-3 of the legal discussion). As far as the use of the term "judicial lien", see the discussion in
footnote 2.
4
Miller has included facts as part of the standard of review for this case, because it is an equity
case. Also, Miller does not agree with some of the "facts" or how some "facts" were presented
in Houghtons and Thomas' opening brief.
5
Some of the page numbers that are used from the court transcript at Addendum 1 may contain
minor errors. I have attempted to cite the exact pages of the record, but because of my situation
of being incarcerated, I have never seen, nor do 1 have access to the court records to verify the
accuracy of the page numbers of the quoted and cited documents. I am certain of the document,
but not the court assigned page number.
2

answered this complaint through his attorney, Blake S. Atkin, denying said allegations
(Addendum 1, pages 72-82).
On December 5, 2000, Houghtons and Thomas' moved the court for the issuance of a
prejudgment writ of attachment (Addendum 1, pages 23-25). On January 12, 2001, Houghtons
and Thomas' amended their previous motion. In this amended motion they stated, "1) That the
Defendant [Miller] is not a resident of this state, [and] 6) That the Defendant fraudulently
contracted the debt or incurred the obligation respecting the action brought." These were the two
reasons given to the court as to why they were entitled to a prejudgment writ of attachment
(Addendum 1, page 85; see also Addendum 8, page 18, lines 17-21).
Miller, through his attorney, contested the motion and moved the court to strike the
defective affidavits provided by Houghtons and Thomas'.

Miller also filed an affidavit

clarifying his residency (Addendum 1, pages 89-104).
On April 16, 2001, the trial court granted the motion for a prejudgment Writ of
Attachment (Addendum 3). White recorded this order on June 15, 2001 (Addendum 4).
Miller was not privy to any other developments in this case until June 6, 2003. On this
date Miller was served a Writ of Execution and Praecipe identifying two of Miller's properties to
be sold at execution. The Writ of Execution was issued on May 1, 2003 (Addendum 7).6
While reading the Writ of Execution, Miller discovered for the first time that a judgment
had been entered against him in this case.

The date of the judgment was April 10, 2003

(Addendum 6 and Addendum 7). Because Miller had never received notice of any judgment or

In an apparent attempt to deprive Miller of his right to be informed of exempt property and his
right to request a hearing, no attachments were with the Writ of Execution as required by Rule
69(g) and the advisory committee note to paragraph (g), U.R.C.P. Miller was fortunate that at
the time of service of the Writ of Execution, he was reviewing the Utah Code books in the jail
(Addendum 1, pages 433-436).
1

proceedings in this case, he assumed that the judgment was a default judgment (Addendum 1,
pages 431-432).
On June 12, 2003, Miller requested an exemption hearing because his property was
entitled to a homestead exemption (Addendum 1, page 410; and Addendum 5).
On July 18, 2003, Miller moved the court to stay the Writ of Execution. The stay of the
Writ of Execution was ordered on July 22, 2003 (Addendum 1, pages 419-420).
On August 4, 2003, the exemption hearing was conducted (Addendum 8). As a result of
this hearing the trial court judge issued his "Order Granting Homestead Exemption" (Addendum
9).

The "FINDINGS" section of this order contained five paragraphs. From the "LEGAL

DISCUSSION" section of this order came the legal conclusion that "The prejudgment writ of
attachment filed on March 26, 2001, is defeated by the filing of a homestead declaration on
March 26, 2003 (Addendum 11, page 3, paragraph 13). The final sentence of the order stated,
"Mr. White to prepare the order consistent with this decision." (Addendum 9, page 3)
Mr. White, attorney for Houghtons and Thomas', prepared an order. However, Miller
contested it for errors and for not being consistent with the court's order dated August 7, 2003.
Because Miller was moved from a county jail to the prison, he requested an enlargement of time
to prepare his objections. This was granted (Addendum 1, pages 455-460).
Meanwhile, Mr. White ordered the sheriff to conduct the execution sale without a court
order lifting the court-ordered stay from July 22, 2003. This was also in violation of the order
granting Miller an extension of time to respond to Mr. White's proposed order. Furthermore,
there was no new writ of execution issued as required by U.R.C.P. Rule 69(h)(2) which states,
"If the originally scheduled date of sale for which notice has been given has passed, notice
of the new date and time shall be provided as required herein. No sale may be held until
the Court has decided upon the issues presented at the hearing."

A

Also Rule 69(i)(2) states,
"...if such postponement is for a longer time than 72 hours, notice shall be given in the
same manner as the original notice of such sale is required to be given."
On September 16, 2003, Mr. White filed a "Notice of Cancellation of Sheriff s Sale (Addendum
1, pages 462-463). He ordered the Sheriff to cancel the sale that he, Mr. White, had ordered.7
Subsequently, Miller filed an affidavit of facts constituting contempt of court in this matter
(Addendum 1, pages 466-468).
On September 19, 2003, Miller's objections to the proposed order were filed, (Addendum
1, pages 471-475), and Mr. White responded with a second order. Relatively few changes were
made, so again, Miller opposed this order and submitted an order that he considered consistent
with the court's order dated August 7. 2003 (Addendum 1, pages 478-479; and Addendum 13).
On October 14, 2003, Mr. White filed his objections to Miller's proposed order and
requested an Oral argument (Addendum 1, pages 496-499).
On December 4, 2003, a hearing was conducted (Addendum 10). After the hearing, the
court signed the order that authorized the homestead property of Miller to be sold (Addendum
11).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 27, 2001, the primary residence of Miller and his family was a house located at
891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah. They had resided in that house since 1994. In December of
2001, a fire destroyed part of that house and made it uninhabitable. At that time, the house

The reasons stated for canceling the sale were: "1. There is an error in the property description
of Property No. 2, [and] 2. The notice is posted under the heading of the 'Tooele Valley Justice
Court' and not the Third District Court in and for Tooele County, State of Utah." It should be
noted that the same description of Property No. 2 was used in the Writ of Execution for the sale
on July 29, 2004, as was used in the Writ issued May 1, 2003. Also, all writs have been issued
by the Third District Court.
5

located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah was being rented, so Millers leased another house.
The fire-damaged house was not repaired, and in July of 2002, it was foreclosed upon.8
When the renters moved out of the property located at 358 North 100 East at the end of
February, 2002, the house was left uninhabitable (Addendum 8, page 14, lines 6-16).

In

Houghtons and Thomas' opening brief (page 4, paragraph 6) they claim that on March 26. 2001,
"the old house was then uninhabitable and provided no shelter or income (See Addendum 8,
page 14, lines 6-16, and Addendum 11, "Findings" at paragraph 10)." This claim is not correct.
Counsel made the above statement and he included it as a "Finding".

However, it is not

supported by any evidence.
In Miller's objection to the order found in Addendum 11, he stated,
"There are other misstatements of fact made in the Plaintiffs' attorney's additional
findings as enumerated 6 through 12. Because the added paragraphs are not consistent
with the 'Findings' found in the 'Court Order', they should be eliminated." (Addendum
1, page 478, paragraph 3).
In September, 2003, Miller's wife and family began cleaning up the house and making
repairs to make the property located at 358 North 100 East inhabitable for a family residence
(Addendum 8, page 22, lines 9-10).
However, in Houghton's and Thomas' opening brief (page 4, paragraph 7), they claim,
"In the early part of 2003, Mrs. Miller began to make repairs to the old house at 358 North 100
East, Tooele, Utah in preparation to move in." Again this claim is not correct. At the hearing on
August 4, 2003, Mr. White clearly states that Miller told him repairs began in September. So
putting "early 2003" as the start date is without foundation, fact, or truth (Addendum 8, page 22,

Because the foreclosure was a matter of public record, and one of the Plaintiffs, Marlene
Thomas, works in the Tooele County Recorder's office, Mr. White could have easily verified
this fact, instead of presuming the foreclosure was December of 2002.
6

lines 9-10; See also Miller's Objections to Findings 6 through 1 .!

li

Uidei

KMin* 1 at

Addendum 1, page 478, paragraph 3).'
On March 26, 2003, Miller's wife and family moved into the old house and she picpaied
a Declaration of Homestead (Addendum

)

I in , • i done without any attempt to defeat any

existing lien and to provide protection and stability for the family (Addendum 8, page29, lines 511; Addendum 1, page 450, line 16).10
..:huM- and Thomas' opening brief (page 5, paragraph 11) they claim, "CrossAppellee opposed the sheriffs sale because his wife hau s=<^ee.^n. .
filed .

. ,\L:raih •

•;

e,i •-: ' :"r.e nouse and

? \Luui 27, 2003." This statement as to why Miller

opposed the sale is not supported by any fact.! *
In fact, Miller opposed ihe Sheriffs sale because of Utah Code Section 78-23-3(3),
which states in part that, "A homestead is exempt from judicial lien and from levy, execution, or
forced sale..."
Because the judgment obtained by Houghtons and Thomas* is a judicial lien, Miller
believed that his properly declared homestead was exempl from KM

Msufinn oi forced sale.

This belief w as held because the judicial lien of Houghtons and Thomas' does not fall within the

Prior to the hearing on August 4, 2003, Mr. White asked Miller when cleanup and repairs were
started. Miller told him September.
10
Prior to the hearing on August 4, 2003, Mr. White asked Miller when his wife moved into the
house. Miller told him March. However, in the hearing, he told the court "May" as the move-in
date. Miller caught the error and said "No", but counsel continued to assert May or a later date
(Addendum 8, page 22, lines 2-9). It would appear that he was trying to assert May because the
judgment was entered April 10, 2003, and the Writ of Execution was issued May 1, 2003. A
move-in date after that would show the home was not occupied as a residence when the Writ of
Execution was issued. This becomes a moot point as a homestead can be claimed up until time
of sale, and occupancy is not necessary. Sanders v. Cassity 586 P. 2d 423 (Utah 1978) and Rich
Cooperative Ass'n v. Dustin, 385 P.2d 155 (Utah 1963).
This statement seems to wrongly infer that Miller's wife moved into the house ;
Declaration of Homestead in an effort to prevent the sale.
7

exceptions listed in 78-23-3(3)(a) through (d) (Addendum 8, page 8, line 8 through page 15, line
1; Addendum 1, pages 445-454).
Furthermore, it is an established fact that another reason Miller opposed the Sheriff sale
was the fact that his wife had been awarded the use of the house by the court as Alimony and
Support pursuant to Utah Code Section 30-4-5 which states,
"Like rights and remedies [of an abandoned spouse] shall be extended to either husband
or wife of the imprisonment of the other in the state prison under a sentence of one year
or more when suitable provision has not been made for the support of the one not so
imprisoned."
Additionally, Utah Code Section 78-23-6 states that
u

An individual is entitled to exemption of the following property to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the individual and his dependants: (1) money or
property received, and rights to receive money or property for alimony or separate
maintenance."
Wherefore, Miller opposed the Sheriffs sale for all of these reasons (Addendum 8, page 15, lines
2-14, and Addendum 1, pages 446-447 (Exhibit 2), 449-450).
On August 2, 2003, the court ordered,
"Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that subject property, 358 North 100 East,
Tooele, UTAH, is subject to the homestead exemption exercised by the Millers and
exempted up to $40,000.00 per Utah Code Annotated 78-23-3(2)(b)(ii)." (Addendum 9,
page 3).
However, in the opening brief (page 5, paragraph 11), Houghtons and Thomas' claim as an
additional fact that the court

"...would not stay the sale of the house because its value exceeded the value of the
alleged homestead exemption. (See Addendum 8, page 30, lines 17-22; Addendum 10,
page 14, lines 9-14, and page 22, lines 6-8; and Addendum 12)."
Miller takes exception to this fact, because the court never made that statement. While the judge
ruled that the homestead exemption amount was $40,000.00, he never stated in the references

8

provided by Mr. White above, that he would not stay the sale of the house because its value
exceeded the value of the allege

nestead exemption. I he references to the record provided

by Mr. White merely establish the property tax valuation amount for Tooele County Corporation.
This amount was $200,09^ fAii-ui: .1

* was stipulated by c<Jiinsel that the value for

determining equity in excess of the homestead exemption would be the assessed value by Tooele
County (Addendum 10, page 14, lines I I I )
"woiM

'::- 'I---

- in no way establishes

t the court

lo of the house because its value exceeded the value of the alleged

homestead exemption."
There is one more fact •

the court should be aware. On September 24, 2003, the

judgment signed on April 10, 2003, was entered into the registry of judgments for Tooele
County.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Constitution of Utah, statutes, and case law, a!

-• i - ;•• u this case, all

clearly affirm that a homestead can be claimed up until the time of sale. It is also clear that the
right to declare a homestead is a right that comes with ownership of properh

h i s alst * hr.v iliat

the ik'tLtratnn] o| ,i limm-stead exemption may be made on more than one property.
Furthermore, the right to declare a homestead on a primary residence may be changed as the
property tl lat is used as tl le primary residence is disposed of or acquired. Statutes and case law
overwhelmingly support the trial comt decision to grant Miller a homestead exemption in the
property located at 35i-

= <» ».-K ; *•

9

, : decision should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT
Argument 1
The legal conclusion that Miller's property qualified for the homestead exemption
recorded on March 27, 2003, and that Miller did have the right to declare a homestead exemption
on the property when a prejudgment writ of attachment was issued on April 17, 2001, is
supported by both evidence and law.
Let's look at the first part of the issue, which is that the property qualified for the
homestead exemption on April 17, 2001.
The right to declare a homestead exemption is a constitutional right that is acquired with
ownership in property. Sanders v. Cassitv 586 P.2d 424,425 (Utah 1978).
It is an established fact that on April 17, 2001, Miller's primary personal residence was
located at 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah. It is also an established fact that Miller owned a
second house located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah. The Constitution of Utah recognizes
that a homestead "may consist of one or more parcels of lands." This is statutorily set forth in
Utah Code Section 78-23-3(2)(c) (Addendum 16). It is clear that the legislative intent was to
allow a homestead exemption on several parcels of real property and not just one.
It is also clear that the legislature has created a homestead exemption for two kinds of
property, to wit, property which is not the primary personal residence and property which is the
primary personal residence. This is found in Code Section 78-23-3(2)(a)(i) and 78-23-3(2)(a)(ii).
The language of these statutes is clear.12 They read as follows:

12

In Gohler v. Wood 919 p.2d 562, 563 (Utah 1996), the Supreme Court quotes its ruling in
Perrine v Kennecott Mining Corp., where it stated, "Thus, we will interpret a statute according to
its plain language, unless such reading is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant
contravention of the express purpose of the statute."

m

78-23-3(2)(a): "An individual is entitled to a homestead exemption consist;.
f
property in this state in an amount not exceeding:
(i) $5,000 in value if the property consists in whole or in part of property which is
not the primary personal residence of the individual; or
(ii) $20,000 in value if the property claimed is the primary personal residence of the
individual."
Therefore, under I huh liw there is a homestead exemption for property that is a primary
personal residence, and one for property that is not a primary personal residence. Just because
the property located at 0 8 North 10(i Hast was not the primary personal residence of Miller on
April 17, 2001, does not preclude the property, as claimed by Houghtons and Thomas' in their
opening brief, (page 8, lines 1

<•

'

.*^< .ul exemption.

Therefore, on April 17, 2001, the property in question qualified for a homestead
exemption under the provisions o r * -23-3(2)(a)(i). a
White in I loughtons

;

:v.

• •*

!

^ l ^ -snored by Mr.

nomas' opening brief where he only cited 78-23-3(2)(a)(ii). (page 7,

lines 8-17)
On page 7 o^ I loii«»hlons :iml Thomas* opening brief, reference is made to statutory
mandates. They state,
"The Utah Exemption Act b , as set forth in Section 78-23-4 et al, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, sets forth the right to claim a homestead exemption, but only after
complying with the statutory mandates."
As set forth ii 1 Miller's section on f hienninalix •.; I ,i\\, Code Section 78-23-4(1) is
dispositive in this case in stating the "statutory mandates". One of the statutory mandates is to
file the declaration of homestead at the office of the cot11lty recorder 01 to serve it upon the
sheriff HI other oftuvr "PRIOR i u i l l L HAL. bTATED I N THE NOTICE OF SUCH
EXECUTION." (Emphasis added)
13

The Utah Exemptions Act is not limited to 78-23-4, et iv I; includes all of Chapter 23.
Therefore, it seems that the correct reference should be 78-23- 1 et .•»! r o d e Section 78-23-4
covers procedure for declaring the homestead exemption.

April 17, 2001, was not the date of execution. Furthermore, the prejudgment Writ of
Attachment was not an execution document.

Execution could not take place until after a

judgment was entered. The first execution date set for this property after judgment was July 23,
2003. Therefore, according to Utah Code Section 78-23-4(1), this property could have been
claimed as a homestead prior to this date, which was done.
Another statutory provision provided by the legislature is the ability of a homeowner to
change their primary residence, and therefore, select another homestead.

Again, there is

dispositive law on this. Utah Code Section 78-23-3(6) states: "The sale and disposition of one
homestead does not prevent the selection or purchase of another."
When Millers were forced to leave their home at 891 Upland Drive due to a fire in
December 2001, another primary residence was selected. Due to the renters occupying the
property at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah, Miller and his family rented another house. After
Miller went to prison and it became apparent that it would be for an extended time, it was
decided to use the rental property, which had become vacant, as their primary residence.
Accordingly, the house was cleaned up, repaired, and occupied as their primary residence.
Thus, as allowed by law, the property at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah, which had
previously qualified for a homestead exemption as a non-primary residence, now qualified for a
homestead exemption as their primary residence. This property was selected and declared as a
homestead prior to any judgment or prior to the scheduling of an execution sale subsequent to the
judgment.
If the sale of the property had been conducted on March 26, 2001, then that date would
have been determinative as to whether the subject property was the primary residence and
properly declared homestead of the Millers. In Houghtons and Thomas' opening brief, there is
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nothing presented to refute the plain language of the statutes, as explained above. ,\liu h allow a
homestead to be declared i

i the sale of the property.

Additionally, the concluding statement of Argument
opening brief on page 8 is, 'Therefore, tl'

.

Houghtons and Thomas'

or exem?>f-ons set forth in Section 78-23-

3(3)(a)(b)(c) and (d) do not apply because they only apply in instances where specific property
qualifies as a 'homestead'." This is a •• -.n * * i * leous stat

*•

; i • .•• • M ; m 78-23-

3(jj ^-d. . aiini ivj clearly shows that the subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) are NOT
"protections or exemptions" for the homestead or homestead exernpi
these four subparagraph

the contrary,

. -.aie the type of liens that are the exceptions to the homestead

exemption and defeat it!
None of these exceptions apj .
1, page 452, lines 3-12; Addendum 8, page

Houghtons and Thomas' judicial lien (Addendum
:

:ies 9-24). Therefore, by law, their judicial lien

cannot deny Miller o\ the right to declare a homestead exemr

^r,;!\-'- prior to any

sale.
None of the positions taken or opinions expressed
brief

j

p

;.

•-,

^-nng

\rgument 1 contained any case law to back them up, except a South Carolina

case to define residence, which is already defined in the law.
i |n\\n </r, (he lojal position that supports Miller's claim that a homestead can be selected
and declared up until the time of sale is not only supported by the law, but by the case law as
well, I,et's 1« • <a v:;i - eases:
In Evans v. Jensen 168 P. 764, 765 (Utah 1917), the Supreme Court stated.

"Courts have frequently held that the exemption may be claimed at any time before the
property is sold; and that the right to claim the exemption is determined as of the time
when the sale is about to take place."14
In Payson Exch. Sav. Bank v. Tietien 225 P. 599, 600 (Utah 19241 the court held that,
"Indeed in this jurisdiction, it is quite sufficient if the judgment debtor notifies the
sheriff or officer holding an execution or order of sale that he claims the premises
attempted to be levied upon as his homestead."
In Brown v. Cleverly 83 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1938). the court stated
"It is a matter of record on the last appeal that the property which appellants seek to
have declared subject to their claim was selected by the Cleverly's as their
homestead...four days prior to the entering of judgment by the court in the original
action. Therefore, at the time appellants obtained a judgment against Cleverly's there
was no property against which a judgment lien could attach."
In Sanders v. Cassity 586 P.2d 425. 426 (Utah 1978), the Supreme Court once again
affirmed that:
"...a declaration of homestead may be made at any time after judgment and before sale
in order to claim the protection of Section 28-1-1 [currently 78-23-3(3)]."
"The formalities of section 28-1-10 [currently 78-23-4] also have as their purpose that
of protecting innocent purchasers... Thus the requirement is that any homestead interest
must be declared prior to sale."
The court further states:
"If the legislature intended otherwise, the statute could have required that the
declaration be made prior to judgment or upon conveyance, or devise. It is obvious that
the reason this was not done is because it is not necessary to raise the homestead
exemption until after a judgment lien has been obtained and the occupant is faced with
dispossession due to execution or forced sale."
Finally, they state:
"...the most reasonable construction is that the homestead is immune from judicial lien,
execution, or forced sale providing a formal declaration of the existing exemption is
made prior to the time set for sale or execution."

14

In earlier cases, such as Kimball v. Salisbury 53 P. 1037 (1898), the declaration of homestead
was allowed after sale.
14

All of these cases are in harmony with the trial court's legal conclusion:
"Under the statutory authority of Utah Code Annotated 78-23-1 et seq. and the Sanders
v. Cassity decision, a homestead exemption may be made at any time after judgment
and before sale. Plaintiffs argument that a prejudgment writ of attachment, (or
judgment for that matter) filed before the homestead exemption, is as unpersuasive
today as it was to the Utah Supreme Court twenty five years ago...Furthermore, even
though the Millers may not have been in occupancy on the property at the time of the
prejudgment writ of attachment, or at the time of judgment, is irrelevant, as the statute
neither requires such in order to declare the exemption and Utah case law recognizes
that occupancy is unnecessary. Rich Cooperative Ass'n v. Dustin, 385 P.2d 155 (Utah
1963)."
Houghtons and Thomas' provide nothing in their opening brief to show this legal
conclusion was in error, Therefore Ilk' emul iiiliiii1 .InmM Iv allium d
Argument 2
Whether the Declaration of 1 lomestead filed

n I hi h, "

l

"Dt11

deleikJ the

prejudgment Writ of Attachment issued against the real property located at 358 North 100 East,
Tooele, Utah, on April 17, 2001 (Addendum 8, page \"

v

•. ;• :L* _••. JM

:•. *• >age 22,

lines 8-13).
With it being conclusive in Utah that the property located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele,
Utah could be declared' a homestead up nniil time of sale, it now becomes necessary to determine
whether the homestead defeats the prejudgment writ of attachment issued April 17, 2001. Let's
take a look at the relevant facts for this issue.
On April 16, 2001, the court issued an Order on Motion for Prejudgment Writ of
Attachment pursuant to a hearing held on March 26, .'»»:•

o

it[

Q n ^p r jj j75 2001, a Writ of Attachment was issued to the Tooele County Sheriff
(Addendum 3)
On Ji ine 6 2001 the Writ of Attachment was returned to the court (Addendum 1, pages
133-146).

On June 15, 2001, Douglas F. White, attorney for the Houghtons and Thomas', recorded
the Order on Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment against the subject property
(Addendum 4).
On March 27, 2003, Miller's wife filed a Declaration of Homestead on the subject
property (Addendum 5).
On April 10, 2003, a judgment was rendered against Miller in favor of Houghtons and
Thomas' by the Third District Court (Addendum 6).
On September 24, 2003, a Notice of Judgment recorded in the Registry of Judgments was
filed with the court (Addendum 1, pages 476-477).
The Determinative Law on this matter is Utah Code Section 78-23-3(3) (Addendum 16).
This Code section sets forth the types of judicial liens that may defeat a declaration of
homestead.

If there is a judicial lien that falls within the exceptions listed, it will defeat a

homestead declaration made subsequent to it. If it does not fall within the exceptions, the
homestead declaration will defeat the judicial lien.
In Houghtons and Thomas' opening brief, page 10, they state "It is the Cross-appellant's
contention that no homestead exemption can be claimed in March of 2003 that will defeat the
judicial lien ordered against the property in March of 2001." What follows this statement is an
array of quotes from different court cases. They never once show why the court erred in their
legal conclusion, and they are arranged in a manner to be misleading.
For example, Houghtons and Thomas' claim that the issue in Sanders v. Cassity is
different than the issue in the case at bar. They never distinguish how the issue of Sanders v.
Cassity, which was determining the question of whether a homestead exemption could be made
prior to sale, is different than the issue in this case. They state that the "footnote 4 at page 426"

16

distinguishes its ruling from this fundamental difference. However, footnote 4 at page 426 is "99
Utah 403, in. I

MI i'i

i r'!<>)." This is the case of McMurdie v. Chugg.

Following this

statement about "footnote 4" Houghtons and Thomas' provide a quote consisting of two
paragraphs. The omission of the quotation marks after ll i. :" fii si j )ai agi a.j )1 i is the ii idication that
the paragraphs are sequential. Even the language of the second paragraph seems to indicate that
it follows the first one.

However, a look at page 426 of Sanders v. Cassity shows

J

paragraphs are not even connected and the second paragraph comes before the first paragraph.
The lien referenced in Evans v. Jensen 168 P. 762 (Utah 1917), was a mechanic's !
that attached to Jensen's properly prior to his homestead declaration.

Mechanic's liens are

exempted under 78-23-3(3)(b) and (d). The judicial lien obtained by Houghtons and Thomas' is
not a mechanic's lien.
A review of Evans v. Jensen and the court's application of it in Sanders, which involve
Dunham, shows it is evident that the court differeir >w between >)\x'v

i>:v<

- li.'n-.

v:i u

liens (78-23-3(3) defeat a subsequent declaration of homestead. However, general judicial liens
are defeated by a declaration of homestead made before the dau i-:
Sanders ti;

.

.;

p;.-[•.

Supio>-»- <
• .'.>»* oilirmed Dunham's homestead exemption over the judgment lien,

just as the trial court granted Miller a homestead exemption over Houghtons and I homas'
general judgment lien in Ihis insl;int P,IM'
As we continue down to the next case quoted on page 10 of the Houghtons and Thomas'
opening briei

v M

I"Evans v. Jensen

first paragraph quoted is not a quote from Evan.

'! **.* p •• .*< -jph- ;i

quoted. However, the

h is a quote found in McMurdie v. Chugg 107

P.2d 163, 166, which is also quoted in Sanders v. Cassitv at page 4„?<u

I in:1 lirn ivforom «"»! w.is

mechanic's lien from Evans v. Jensen. It was used to support the decision in McMurdie v.
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Chugg that a lien for the purchase price of the property could not be defeated by the subsequent
declaration of a homestead exemption (78-23-3(3)(b).

Houghtons and Thomas' judgment

recorded on September 24, 2003, was not for the purchase price of the home.
The second paragraph quoted refers to the case of Crosby v. Anderson 162 P. 75. In that
case, Crosby obtained a judgment against Anderson for a tort.

However, before she could

execute on Anderson's non-exempt property, he sold it. He then used the proceeds to buy land
and build a house for his family, the title of which was placed in his wife's name. They then
declared the property exempt as a homestead and it defeated Crosby's judgment lien. It should
be noted that the comma near the end of the second line after "exempt" should be a semi-colon.
This is the grammatical punctuation in the case, and it is used to separate two complete thoughts,
not qualify the first thought with the second. This is important because the reference to the
conversion to a homestead before a lien attaches is referring to Jensen trying to defeat a
mechanic's lien, and not to Anderson converting non-exempt property to a homestead exemption
which defeated a non-excepted judicial lien.
Nowhere among all of these quotes do Houghtons and Thomas' show how or why their
lien is the type that can be or should be exempted under Code Section 78-23-3(3).
Waples on Homestead and Exemption (1893), page 306, explains that in states where a
homestead exemption can be claimed before the time of sale, a judgment 4 is rendered subject to
the right of the debtor to select his exempt portion. No specific lien rests upon any piece of the
defendant's property. So, the particular piece selected after judgment, not exempt at the time of
judgment, becomes so by selection before sale."
While Houghtons and Thomas' quote in their opening brief from 40 C.J.S. § 54, the liens
that are referenced fall within the exceptions to the homestead found in Code Section 78-23-3(3).
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However, Houghtons and Thomas' do not show how their claim or lien falls within the
exceptions as the liens in the quoted rule that would show the trial court erred, other than the
statement, "Counsel can find no exception to this rule."
If counsel would read in C J.S. § 54 a little further, the last paragraph of subsection C
states, "A homestead is immune from a judgment lien, execution or forced sale if the formal
declaration of the existing exemption is made prior to the time set for sale or execution.77" This
is the same quote used by the trial court in their Order Granting Homestead Exemption to Miller
(Addendum 9, page 2). Footnote 77 cites Sanders v. Cassity and states,
"Interest in real property held by judgment debtor, who was entitled to homestead
exemption before judgment lien was recorded was immune from such lien, though
debtor did not formally claim the homestead exemption until after the judgment was
docketed."
As has been previously shown, Miller was entitled to a homestead exemption when property was
acquired. Sanders v. Cassity 586 P.2d 236, 238.
In Houghtons and Thomas' opening brief, the assumption, or presumption made, is that
the order and subsequent issue of a prejudgment writ of attachment was a perfected lien.
However, because it is a prejudgment writ of attachment, it is, at most, only an inchoate or
contingent lien. Jensen v. Eames 519 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah 1974). If in fact, this order of
prejudgment writ of attachment were a perfected lien as they claim, then why did they not
foreclose on the property before it became the primary personal residence of the Millers?
The answer is that they did not have the right of sale. As quoted by Houghtons and
Thomas' from Waples on page 11 of the opening Brief, in the first line, "When the law gives the
right of attachment for debt, it gives also that of sale, to complete the object: the satisfaction of
the debt." So, Houghtons and Thomas' did not have the right of sale until they had the right of
attachment. Hence, the prejudgment Writ of Attachment was only a contingent lien.
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So, when does this right to sell the property become a vested right? The next sentence of
Waples gives the answer. "Such right is, from the time the lien attaches by seizure, a vested
right." The opening Brief of Houghtons and Thomas' gives no evidence nor provides any
argument to show that the prejudgment Writ of Attachment ever attached or that it was ever
perfected. Nor did it show that if it were perfected, that it fell under the exceptions found in
Code Section 78-23-3(3)(a), (b), (c), or (d) to defeat a declaration of homestead that was made
before the sale of the property.
However, the facts of this case show that there was no attachment of the prejudgment
Writ of Attachment (Addendum 1, pages 133-146; Addendum 3; Addendum 4; and Addendum
14). Let's examine why these facts show that there was no attachment.
The date pointed to by the Houghtons and Thomas' as to the day they attached the
property is March 26, 2001. In order for this date to defeat a declaration of homestead, it must
be shown that it was of the nature to be excepted from the homestead under either 78-233(3)(a),(b),(c), or (d), and that it attached to the property prior to the declaration of homestead.
We know there is not exception, but let's look at why there was no attachment until September
24,2003.
When the order was given in the hearing on March 26, 2001, there was not attachment.
"A writ of attachment does not become effective until it is levied. Otherwise stated,
without a valid levy, an order of attachment is not perfected so as to create a lien of
attachment but remains executory until rolled by a judgment in the principal action or
until perfected by a levy under the original or an alias order." (underline added) 6 Am
Jur 2d §319.
Recording of the order (Addendum 4) by Marlene R. Thomas for Douglas F. White (Plaintiff and
Attorney for the plaintiff) does not perfect the levy.
In 6 Am Jur 2d § 480 ATTACHMENT, it reads:
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''Statutory provisions for an attachment are strictly construed; an attachment does not
become a lien until the statutory attachment lien requirements are satisfied, (underline
added) Matson Nav. Co. v. F.D.I.C, 916 P.2d 680 (Hawaii 1996); Maynard v. Phifer,
286 S.C. 76, 332 S.E.2d 99 (1985)."
This rule of attachment was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in Bank of Ephraim v. Davis,
581 P.2d 1001, 1006 (Utah 1978), where it stated, "the only way this lien can be established is by
strictly following every provision of the statute." The provisions of Rule 64C were not strictly
followed so there was no attachment.
Since an order doesn't create the lien, a writ of attachment must be issued pursuant to the
order. This was done on April 17, 2001. However, a writ of attachment, in and of itself does not
create a lien.
"An attachment lien does not become effective merely by the issuance of the writ of
attachment or by placing the writ in the hands of the officer. There must be an effective
levy on the property itself and such levy is a jurisdictional requisite." (6 Am Jur 2d §
320)
In C.J.S. § 234 we find a description of the levy process. It says, "In general a levy
attachment upon realty, unlike personalty, is perfected by notice and recording without the actual
seizure and possession. To constitute a valid levy on land, the officer must do some act which
shows that the officer has seized the property and exercised dominion over it and which is
sufficient to put the owner or tenant upon notice." This seizure must be done under the statutory
provisions, and strict compliance is required.1:>
Rule 64C, U.R.C.P. governs the attachment process16. 64C(e)(l) establishes the specific
actions the officer must take to effect the levy. The officer is required to file with the County
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Other authorities that describe the requirements necessary to create a valid lien are C.J.S. §
235 Service of Writ and Description; C.J.S. § 236 Filing and Recording; and 6 Am Jur 2d §325
Notice, and Utah Civil Practice § 13.05.
16
It should be noted that in Utah Civil Practice 13.05[1] Who May Seek Attachment, it says
"The Plaintiff in an action upon a judgment, upon any contract, express or implied, or in an
21

Recorder a copy of the writ, a description of the property attached, and a notice that it is
attached.
Another significant limitation on attachments is that they must be acted upon quickly.17
Rule 64C(h) requires the sheriff to return the writ, with a certificate of his proceedings thereon
within 20 days after receiving the writ. This requirement is further confirmed by the Utah
Supreme Court in Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 581 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1978). Where the court
stated, "In the instant case there was a failure to comply with Rule 64C(h), thus plaintiff did not
acquire a lien on the attached property."
Looking at the facts in the instant case, the Writ of Attachment was issued to the Tooele
County Sheriff on April 17, 2001 (Addendum 3). It was returned to the court on June 6, 2001
(Addendum 1, pages 133-146). In particular, addendum 1 page 136 shows that the sheriff
received the Writ on April 24, 2001, from Douglas F. White. This shows that there was a total of
43 days from receipt until return! This is an obvious failure to comply with Rule 64C(h).
Furthermore, a review by the Tooele County Recorder (Addendum 14) shows that the
sheriff did not record the Writ of Attachment, Description of the property, or Notice of
attachment against the property. This is a failure to comply with Rule 64C(e).
The only thing recorded against the property that could be a semblance of a lien is the
Order on Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment (Addendum 4). However, this was filed
by MRT (Marlene R. Thomas, Plaintiff and employee in the County Recorder's office) for
Douglas F. White (Attorney for the Plaintiffs), as agent for Plaintiffs.
6 Am Jur 2d § 321 comments on persons authorized to execute the writ:

action against a nonresident of Utah, may seek attachment." Action against a nonresident is the
only basis Houghtons and Thomas' could seek attachment. (Addendum 1, page 18, lines 19-21)
17
See 6 Am Jur 2d § 323 and Utah Civil Practice § 13.05[4](10).
??

"As a general rule, an attachment can be levied or the writ executed only by the officer
to whom it can be levied or the writ executed only by the officer to whom it is directed,
who, of course, must by law be duly authorized so to act; an attachment by an officer
without authority of law is no attachment at all." Then as an observation it states, "An
officer who executes according to the mandate of a writ for attachment is an agent for
neither party but a surrogate of the law."
The facts of the case bear out that there was a failure to comply with Rule 64C, "thus
Plaintiffs did not acquire a lien on the attached property." (Bank of Ephraim v. Davis)
Therefore, with no attachment, there was not lien until the judgment was recorded in the registry
of judgments on September 24, 2003 (Addendum 1, pages 476-477). Even if the Houghtons and
Thomas' had a lien that was excepted by 78-23-3(3), the Declaration of Homestead recorded on
March 27, 2003 (Addendum 5) is first in time, first in line.
CONCLUSION
The trial court was correct in granting Miller a homestead exemption on property located
at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah. As stated by the trial court,
"Plaintiffs' argument that a Prejudgment Writ of Attachment (or judgment for that
matter), filed before the homestead exemption on the subject property was declared,
comprised the efficacy of the homestead exemption, is as unpersuasive today as it was
to the Utah Supreme Court twenty five years ago."
Houghtons and Thomas" have provided nothing to refute this statement, and the facts support the
court's decision.
Miller acquired the right to declare the property as a homestead when he obtained title to
the property. A declaration of homestead was filed to protect the property for the use of Miller's
family. This was done prior to judgment and prior to the time set for sale.
Because there was a failure to comply with Rule 64C, U.R.C.P., there was no attachment
to the property, and therefore, no lien prior to the judgment lien of September 24, 2003.
Furthermore, the homestead is immune from judicial liens, provided that a formal declaration of
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homestead is made prior to the time set for the sale, unless there is an exception as provided in
Code Section 78-23-3(3)(a), (b), (c), or (d). There is no exception to defeat Miller's Declaration
of Homestead.
Wherefore, Miller and his property are eligible for the homestead exemption, and the trial
court's decision should be affirmed; and that costs be granted to Miller, the cross-appellee, along
with any other equitable relief that may be granted.

Respectfully submitted this

N^K

day of December, 2004.

Glen E. Miller
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Glen E. Miller, certify that on Tfrtfrmkar yOjlsOO1!

I caused two copies of the

attached Cross-Appellee Brief to be served upon Douglas F. White, the counsel for the CrossAppellant in this matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage pre-paid
to the following address:

Douglas F. White
3282 South Sunset Hollow Drive
Bountiful, UT 84010
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Notice of Withdrawal as Counsel
408 - 409
Request for Hearing, Notification of
410
Return on Writ of Execution
411 - 416
Notice of Hearing on Writ of Execution
417 - 418
Summary Motion to Stay Writ of Execution
419
Order for Stay of Execution
420
Request for Transportation to Attend Hrg
421
Transportation Order to Attend Scheduled Hrg 422
Motion to Set Aside Judgment
423 - 432
Affidavit of Defendant Glen E. Miller
433 - 436
Minutes - Oral Argument
437
Order Granting Homestead Exemption
438 - 441
Memorandum for Record
442 - 443
Request for Video
444
Memorandum for Record
445 - 454
Motion for Enlargement of Time to File
455 - 456
Written Objections to Proposed Order on
Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment
Motion for Enlargement of Time to File
457 - 458
Written Objections to Proposed Order on
Motion to Determine Homestead Exemption
Letter from Glen Miller
459
Order Granting Motion for Enlargement of
460
Time
Order Granting Motion for Enlargement of
461
Time
Notice of Cancellation of Sheriff's Sale
462 - 463
Motion for Enlargement: of Time zo File
464 - 465
Written Objections
Affidavit of Facts Constituting Contempt
466 - 468
of Court
Letter from Atty Angerhofer to Inmate
469
Placement Program
Letter to the Judge from Glen E. Miller
470
Objections to Proposed Order on Motion to 471 - 475
Determine Homestead Exemption
Notice of Judgment Recorded in the
476 - 477
Registry of Judgments
Objections to Plaintiffs1 Order on
478 - 479
Hearing on Writ of Execution Granting
Homestead Exemption and Defendant's
Proposed order
Letter to the Judge from Atty White
480

Houghtons & Thomases V. M i l l e r
Date Filed
10/03/03
10/07/03
10/07/03
10/09/03
10/14/03
10/14/03
10/27/03
11/17/03
11/19/03
12/03/03
12/04/03
12/04/03
12/05/03
12/11/03
12/12/03
12/15/03
12/18/03
12/23/03
12/29/03
02/30/03
01/06/04
01/08/04
01/13/04
01/13/04
01/16/04
01/22/04
02/17/04
02/24/04
02/27/04
03/01/04

Case #000301127

Document

Page 4
Page Number

Notice to Submit for Decision and/or
481 - 482
Request for Oral Argument
Objections to Order to Set Aside Summary
483
Judgment
Notice to Submit for Decision and Judicial 484 - 493
Notice
Request for Judicial Notice of Homestead
494 - 495
Objection to Defendant's Proposed Order
496 - 497
on Writ of Execution Granting Homestead
Exemption
Request for Oral Argument
498 - 499
Notice of Oral Argument
500 - 502
Verified Affidavit of Glen E. Miller
503 - 506
Order of Transportation
507
Notice of Appearance of Counsel
508 - 509
Minutes - Oral Argument
510
Order on Hearing on Writ of Execution
511 - 516
Granting Homestead Exemption
Copy of Writ of Execution
517 - 520
Motion to Stay Order Pending Appeal
521 - 524
Notice of Appeal and Request for Waiver
525 - 527
of Fees
Ruling and Order
528 - 531
Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel
532 - 533
Letter from Glen E. Miller Requesting a
534 - 536
Transcript
Request for Hearing - Notification of
537
Exemption
Notice of Cross-Appeal
538 - 539
Return of Service on Writ of Execution
540 - 543
Letter from Utah Court of Appeals
544
Minute Entry
545 - 549
Minute Entry
550 - 551
Request for Transcripts
552 - 553
Letter from Utah Court of Appeals
554
Petition for Rule 65B Extraordinary Relief 555 - 574
Proof of Publication of Notice of Sheriff's
575
Sale of Real Property
Letter from Utah Court of Appeals
576
Order - Utah Court of Appeals
577
TRANSCRIPTS

01/30/04
01/30/04

Hearing Held December 4, 2003
Hearing Held August 4, 2003

578
579
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DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 652-0016
FAX: (801)296-1754

FILED

° G l b f R i C T COURT TOOELE

0IAPRI7

AM 10: If 8

FILED BY.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS,
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)1
;}
]>

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF
ATTACHMENT

]
'

GLEN E. MILLER,
Defendants.

])
)
'

Civil No. 000301127
Judge David S. Young

The Plaintiffs' Motion for a Prejudgment Writ of Attachment came before the Court on the
26th day of March, 2001, before the Honorable David S. Young, Judge; the Plaintiffs were present
and represented by their attorney, Douglas F. White; the Defendant was not personally present, but
was represented by his attorney, Gregory P. Hawkins; the Court having reviewed the pleadings and
the evidence by proffer of the attorneys, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the
following Order:
1.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment against the following

described parcels of real property is hereby granted:
1

Parcel No. 1: All of Lot 1, Oak View Heights #4, a subdivision of Tooele City.
Serial No 10-8-C-l
Parcel No. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast corner of Lot 5, Block 41,
Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, running thence West 196.9$ feet;
thence North 43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 43.5
feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-57-27
Parcel No. 3: Beginning 303 feet, more or less, South of the Northwest coxner of
Block 26, Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, said point of
beginning being the Southwest corner of the Hawker property; and
running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet; thence West 9
feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence West 495 feet; thence North
66.5 feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-42-14
2.

The Court orders that any and all interest, right and title of Glen E. Miller in the

above-described properties be attached. The Defendant is restrained from transferring his interest
to another in anyway.
3.

A Writ of Attachment is hereby authorized by this Court pursuant to Rule 64(c) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
4.

The Court orders that in lieu of requiring a bond be set, that the Plaintiffs will appear

before the Court, upon motion of the Defendant or others, as the case may be, from time to time
during the period of this Writ of Attachment, for the purpose of determining whether the Writ of
Attachment should continue based upon the Defendant's circumstances.
DATED this

/ C day of April, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

DAVID S.YOUNG J
Third Distrfct Court Judgi

2

NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY
TO:

Gregory P. Hawkins
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the

undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is
mailed to you to allow you sufficient time to file any written objections to the form of the foregoing
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form are filed within that
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing.
I do hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on this
of March, 2001, to the following person(s):

Gregory P. Hawkins
Attorney for Defendant
136 South Main Street, 6th Floor
Salt lake City, Utah 84115

jgAxO,

JUDWETE^JSON
Legal Assistant

*'*

S

* - '» CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN
raiGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD
v
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* '."UTAH
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Tab 3

SERVI.D PERSONAL!

DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 652-0016
FAX: (801) 296-1754

M

^H.

VVTKJN NAMED DEFEND,„,t" AT <=^rr^.

gjfc^

TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH
BY DEPUTY
THIS

AC

DAY OF

~^cr

20OJ

.FRANKA.SCHARMANN
Shertff, Tooele, Utah

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS,
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,

WRIT OF ATTACHMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
GLEN E.MILLER,

Civil No. 000301127
Judge David S. Young
Defendants.

THE STATE OF UTAH
To the Sheriff of Tooele County, State of Utah, GREETINGS:
WHEREAS, the above-entitled Court, on the 26* day ofMarch, 2001, granted the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment; and as such, any and. all interest, right and title of Glen
' E. Miller in the below described real property is hereby attached.
WHEREAS, the Sheriff of Tooele County, State of Utah, is hereby directed to attach and
keep safe all of the real pfoperty set forth below until further order of the Court, pursuant to Rule
64(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Said real property hereby attached is described as follows:
Parcel No. 1: All of Lot 1, Oak View Heights #4, a subdivision of Tooele City. Serial No. 10-8-C-l
Parcel No. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast corner of Lot 5, Block 41, Plat "A", Tooele
City Survey, running thence West 196.96 feet; thence North 43.5 feet; thence East
196.96 feet; thence South 43.5 feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-57-27
Parcel No. 3: Beginning 303 feet, more or less, South of the Northwest corner ofJBlock 26, Plat
"A", Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, said point of beginning being the Southwest
corner of the Hawker property; and running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248
feet; thence West 9 feet; thence North 181.5 feet, thence West 495 feet; thence North
66.5 feet to the point of beginning. Serial No 2-42-14
Given under my hand and the seal of said Court this h

day of April, A.D. 2001.
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CLERK
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FILED

DOUGLAS F WHITE, #3443
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 652-0016
FAX: (801)296-1754

•»RD DISTRICT COURT TOOELE

OnPRll
FILED BY__

MlO'-kB
M

E 1 6 4 9 0 & B 0€>&-7
P OO
Date 15-JUN-2001 12:00pm
Fee:
18.00 Cash
CALLEEN B. PESHELL, Recorder

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DI SLi&M&Tfls F
TOOELE COUNTY CORPORATION

TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS,
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF
ATTACHMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
GLENE.MLLLER,

Civil No. 000301127
Judge David S. Young
Defendants.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for a Prejudgment Writ of Attachment came before the Court on the
26th day of March, 2001, before the Honorable David S. Young, Judge; the Plaintiffs were present
and represented by their attorney, Douglas F. White; the Defendant was not personally present, but
was represented by his attorney, Gregory P. Hawkins; the Court having reviewed the pleadings and
the evidence by proffer of the attorneys, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the
following Order:
1.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment against the following

described parcels of real property is hereby granted:

E 1G490G B oes'z P o o a e
Parcel No. 1: All of Lot 1, Oak View Heights #4, a subdivision of Tooele City.
Serial No. 10-8-C-l
Parcel No. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast corner of Lot 5, Block 41,
Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, running thence West 196.96 feet;
thence North 43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 43.5
feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-57-27
Parcel No. 3: Beginning 303 feet, more or less, South of the Northwest corner of
Block 26, Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, said point of
beginning being the Southwest corner of the Hawker property; and
running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet; thence West 9
feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence West 495 feet; thence North
66.5 feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-42-14
2.

The Court orders that any and all interest, right and title of Glen E. Miller in the

above-described properties be attached. The Defendant is restrained from transferring his interest
to another in anyway.
3.

A Writ of Attachment is hereby authorized by this Court pursuant to Rule 64(c) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
4.

The Court orders that in lieu of requiring a bond be set, that the Plaintiffs will appear

before the Court, upon motion of the Defendant or others, as the case may be, from time to time
during the period of this Writ of Attachment, for the purpose of determining whether the Writ of
Attachment should continue based upon the Defendant's circumstances.
DATED this

day of April, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

DAVTDS.YOUNGJ

~7)

Third Distrfct Court Judge-—s
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NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY
TO:

Gregory P. Hawkins
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the

undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) daysfromthe date this notice is
mailed to you to allow you sufficient time tofileany written objections to the form of the foregoing
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form are filed within that
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing.
I do hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on this
2^fday of March, 2001, to the following person(s):
Gregory P. Hawkins
Attorney for Defendant
136 South Main Street, 6th Floor
Salt lake City, Utah 84115

juej^t

JUDWETE^SON
Legal Assistant
J CERTIFY THA) THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THJRD
DISTRICT COURT. TOOELE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH jr\
fl[
DATE..

/h>4—
DEPUTY(
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Tab 5

Declaration of Homestead
1. I, Lori Lee Thiriot Miller, claimant, a married woman hereby declare that I am
entitled to a homestead exemption under Utah Constitution, Article XXII Section
2. Claimant further states that her spouse has not filed a declaration of homestead.
3. The'homestead claimed as exempt in this Declaration of Homestead is located
at 35 8 North 100 East, Tooele, Tooele County, Utah and is more fully described
to wit:
Beginning 303 feet, more or less, south of the Northwest corner of block 26,
Plat "A"^Tooele-City Survey; Tooele City, said point of beginning being the
Southwest corner of the Hawker Property; and running thence East 504;
thence South 248 feet; thence West 9 feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence
West 495 feet; thence North 66.5 feet to the point of beginning.
4;: The estimated cash value of this real property is $85,000.
5; vThe;>amount of the homestead claimed is $120,000 as computed as follows:
Lori;Lee Thiriot Miller, 47, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah
'•6ten Eugene Miller,
48, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah
Thofnas Samuel Miller, 21, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele,'Utah
Angela Miller,
18, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele,-Utah
Kimberly Miller,
16, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele/Utah
•Elizabeth Miller,
14, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele,iUtah

COUNTY OF TOOELE )

Acknowledged, subscribed and sworn before me, ^ A ? | M I ? ^
a Notary Public for the State of Utah, this ^^day^of •' MftflCtJ
My commission expires ,Q [ Q&n f.w_&f.<Z_ ^ ^ 3 .

ShfiFy.n^
•

, 2003.

Tab 6

& -£B DISTRICT COURT

Third Judicial District
APR 1 8 2003
.TOOELE COUNTY
By.
Deputy Clerk"

DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (435) 843-9399
FAX: (435) 843-9399

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS,
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
])
]

JUDGMENT

]
'

GLEN E. MILLER,

)
)

Civil No. 000301127
Judge Randall Skanchy

Defendants.

COMES NOW, the Court and having considered the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and Defendant's response to it, and having reviewed the pleadings onfileherein and good
cause appearing therefore; the Court now hereby enters the following order and JUDGMENT as
follows:
1.

There is no genuine issue of material facts in dispute; and therefore, the Plaintiffs are

entitled to a judgment against the Defendant as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah
1

Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.

3.

Jerry Houghton and Susan Houghton are granted a judgment, jointly and severally,

against the Defendant, Glen E. Miller, in the amount of $88,129.00 as of November 30, 2002. Post
judgment interest to accrue at the contract rates.
4.

Kendall R. Thomas, Marlene Thomas and the 1995 Thomas Family Trust are granted

a judgment, jointly and severally* against the Defendant, Glen E.. Miller. Post judgment interest to
accrue at the contract rates.

\

!

A

^

U

^

^

^

4 [ %l, aC<t, 2£>

<p^—

DATED this J g ^ day of April, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

RAND ALU SKANCHY
Judge

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY

TO:

LONN LITCHFIELD
Pursuant to Rule 4.504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the

undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is
mailed to you to allow you sufficient-tHS^tcrfjfe

3»"

,-N^

with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form are filed within that
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing.
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on
this 3rd day of April, 2003, to the following person(s):

Lonn Litchfield
ATKIN & HAWKINS
Attorney at Law
136 South Main, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

JUD^ETER§ON, Legal Assistant

3

Tab 7

DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (435) 843-9399
FAX: (435) 843-9399

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
)
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, )
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
)
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,
]
Plaintiffs,
vs.

WRIT OF EXECUTION

]
'
)
)

GLEN E. MILLER,

Civil No. 000301127
Judge Randall Skanchy

Defendant.

THE STATE OF UTAH
To the Sheriff of Tooele County, State of Utah, GREETINGS:
WHEREAS, Judgment was rendered in this action by the above Court in said County, on
the 10th day of April, 2003, against said Defendant, Glen E. Miller, and in favor of said Plaintiffs,
in the amount of:
Judgment amount
Estimated costs of this Writ

$271,398.00
$
65.00

with interest pursuant to judgment contract rates, from the date of judgment until paid, plus afteraccruing costs.
THESE ARE, THEREFORE, to command you to collect the aforesaitfjudgment, with
costs, interest, and fees, and to sell enough of the Defendant's real or personal property to satisfy the
same. This shall be your sufficient warrant for so doing. Within sixty (60) days after your receipt
of this Writ, return this Writ with a statement and certificate of your doings in completing the
service. WHEREOF FAIL NOT.
Given under my hand and the seal of said Court this /

2

day of Aprti; A.D. 2003.

DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (435) 843-9399
FAX: (435) 843-9399

IN THE TOOELE VALLEY JUSTICE'S COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS,
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)I
)

PRAECIPE

]
]
:

GLEN E. MILLER,

)
)

Civil No. 000301127
Judge Randall Skanchy

Defendant.

TO THE SHERIFF OF TOOELE COUNTY:
Pursuant to the Writ of Execution herewith handed you, you are required to levy on and sell
the following property belonging to the judgment debtor, Glen E. Miller. Said properties are located
at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Tooele County, State of Utah and lot behind 288 North Main (see
plat map), Tooele, Tooele County, State of Utah, respectively; and fiirther described as follows:
PARCEL NO. 1: Beginning 303 feet South of the Northwest Corner of Block 26,
Plat "A", Tooele City Survey; running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet;
thence West 9 feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence West 495 feet; thence North 66.5
feet to point of beginning, combining T-504 and T-504-1. Containing 0.77 acres.
Parcel No. 02-42-14.

PARCELNO. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast Comer of Lot 5, Block
41, Plat "A", Tooele City Survey; running thence West 196.96 feet; thence'North
43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 435. feet to the point of beginning
out of 2-57-17. Containing 0.20 acres. Parcel No. 2-57-27.

DATED this 3o day of April, 2003.

v

)UG1AS F. WHITE
'Attorney for Plaintiffs
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Tab 8

-1IN THE 'iHIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON,
Plaintiff,
Case No.

vs ,
GLEN E .

000301127

MILLER,
Defendant.

Hearing
E l e c t r o n i c a l l y Recorded
A u g u s t 4, 2003

on

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE RANDALL N. SKANCHY
T h i r d D i s t r i c t C o u r t Judge

APPEARANCES
For the

Plaintiff:

DOUGLAS F . WHITE
3282 S o u t h S u n s e t H o l l o w D r
B o u n t i f u l , Utah 84010
Telephone:
(435)843-9399

For the

Defendant:

GLEN E . MILLER
(Appearing pro se)
(Address n o t p r o v i d e d )
(Phone number n o t p r o v i d e d )

Transcribed

by:

B e v e r l y Lowe,

CSR/CCT

1909 S o u t h Washington Avenue
P r o v o , Utah 84606
T e l e p h o n e : (B01) 3 7 7 - 0 0 2 7

-21

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on August 4, 2003)

3

THE COURT: This is the matter of Jerry Houghton versus

4

Glen Miller.

5

aside the writ of —

6

we're at.

It's case 000301127.

Mr. Miller's motion to set

set aside the judgment.

So that's where

Go ahead.

7

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, could I have a pen —

8

released so that I might be able to use a pen so that I could

9

take notes?

10
11

THE COURT: I'll only do that if my security officers
indicate that's acceptable.

12
13

MR. MILLER: Also, this is a hearing on the writ of
execution, or is this a hearing on the motion for dismissal?

14

THE COURT: It's a hearing on both.

15

MR. MILLER: Okay.

16

So we'll be discussing both at this

time?

17

THE COURT: I think so.

18

MR. MILLER: Because —

19

a hana

okay.

Because I was not told

that we would be having the hearing on both, your Honor.

20

THE COURT: Well, you've come a long way and it would

21

be nice to have you be able to have everything handled today.

22

MR. MILLER: Okay.

Whatever we —

before I —

we

23

discuss the writ of execution, your Honor, may I ask some

24

questions pertaining to the judgment itself?

25

THE COURT: No, no.

I just want you to present your

-3-

1

argument.

2

a lot of people that need to be heard.

You know, I've got a busy calendar here.

We've got

3

MR. MILLER: Well, this —

4

THE COURT; I need to hear your argument on this

5

particular issue so we can go forward.

6

MR. MILLER: Okay.

I have outlined in the motion to

7

dismiss the issues involved.

8

was a judgment at all ir. zhis case. I had not received any

9

notice until I received zhe writ of execution on the 6th of

10

June, and so under the summary judgment I had not even been

11

notified that zhere was a judgment, that I could respond to the

12

judgment or that matter.

13

I was never even aware that there

Also, in the wriz of execution there gave an amount

14

of the judgmenz of $271,000 that was granted to the plaintiffs.

15

I was wondering where thaz figure came from in this particular

16

case.

17
18

THE COURT: You know, the way things work here, you
make an argument and I Listen to ir.

19

MR. MILLER: Okay.

20

THE COURT: I ar. not here to be questioned.

I simply

21

hear your argument.

22

want to say that is "and I think that's in error/' or something

23

like that

What you may say, then, is the way you'd

—

24

MR. MILLER: Okay.

25

THE COURT: —

as opposed to posing some question to me
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about it (inaudible).

2
3

MR. MILLER: Okay, your Honor, this is the first time
I've ever done this, so

4

—

THE COURT: Well, you've done a very nice job in terms

5

of what you've provided the Court.

6

and useful.

7
8

It's been very beneficial

So you're doing great so far.

Just

MR. MILLER: Okay, thank you, your Honor.
scared, too, and it's -just

9

—
Yes, and I'm

—

THE COURT: No reason to be scared.

10

MR. MILLER: Okay.

Also, the reason I brincr that

11

point

12

November of 1999, but m

13

received a judgment on the promissory notes, and that was

14

already issued m , like I say, in January or February of the

15

year 2000.

16

up is that the plaintiffs had filed a lawsuit

m

January or February of 2000 they

This particular lawsuit, as I understand it, as

17

I don't have all the paperwork pertaining to it, is a

18

supplementary one.

19

personally for fraud, and so that one —

20

judgment m

21

me is for the amount of the promissory note that has already

22

been resolved under the first lawsuit tnat was —

23

awarded a judgment of in 2000 against LD&B Corporation.

24
25

It's one filed after that against me
and now if this

this second lawsuit filed by the plaintiffs against

So according to —

they were

under the rules of the res judicata

this shouldn't be able to be tried agair.

So that is a reason
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for —

2

judgment should be set aside.

3
4

another reason not mentioned m

my motion as to why this

THE COURT: Mr. White, does your client have a judgment
against Mr. Miller that- precedes this one on these same

—

5

MR. WHITE: No.

6

THE COURT: —

7

MR. WHITE: It is against a company called LD&B.

8

THE COURT: Okay.

9

MR. WHITE: Totally separate.

10

issues?

All right.

THE COURT: What I'd indicate to you, Mr. Miller, is

11

that parties may sue people m

their individual and m

their

12

corporate capacities, and maybe that's what occurred.

13

judgment has been taken against your corporation or whatever

14

it was, and I'm not privy to thar, so I don't know.

A

15

MR. MILLER: Uh-huh.

16

THE COURT: And B, subsequently a judgment was taken

17

against you personally.

18

based upon the allegations of self dealing or not maintaining

19

a corporation, that you might be subject to these particular

20

judgments, but regardless of that, the judgment's been entered.

21

So now we understand that they're not —

22

judgments taken against you.

23

apply.

24

25

Maybe in this case based upon

—

they're not two

So res judicata is not going to

MR. MILLER: But the promissory notes are exactly the
same,
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1

THE COURT: It doesn't matter.

2

MR. MILLER: And that would be a —

3

that would be a

defense that would be raised at a trial.

4

THE COURT: You see, res judicata, of course, would

5

mean that you had been sued twice in your individual capacity

6

for the same debt by the same parties.

7
8

MR. MILLER: I was sued in that first one, and the
judgment was issued, though, against LD£3 Management.

9

10

THE COURT: All right.

there.

11
12

MR. MILLER: Okay.

New, I'd like to right now, your

Honor, address the homestead issue that I filed

13
14

I understand your argument

—

THE COURT: Address the service issue for me, please.
That's the most important one.

15

MR. MILLER: The service issue?

16

THE COURT: Yes.

17

MR. MILLER: Okay.

Z!he only service which I received

18

was the writ of execution.

There was nc other service that I

19

received.

20

informed of any lawsuit that was pending against me in these

21

proceedings.

22

asked if there had —

23
24
25

I was not informed of any judgment.

I was not

I had written my attorney on February 13th and
was anything that was going on.

THE COURT: Now, your attorney unfortunately withdrew,
and so this is where you end up.
THE COURT: And he withdrew, as I understood, m

April

-7-

1

or —

but he never sent me any notification of withdrawal.

2

THE COURT: Withdrew.

He withdrew on the 25r-n of April

3

2003, although I note that no order was entered by a Judge,

4

meaning he hadn't officially withdrawn.

5

MR. MILLER: Yeah, Mr. White informed me today that

6

he had withdrawn.

7

written

I had

—

8
9

That was the first I had heard.

THE COURT: Well, he believes he's withdrawn, but until
an order is executed by the Judge, he hasn't.

10

MR. MILLER: And so I have not —

I had not received

11

anything pertaining to the issues of the case, being able

12

to argue against the summary judgment, morion for summary

13

judgment.

14

in the —

15

because I was never informed of the judgment and I was never

16

able to provide a defense.

17

I've outlined in ny motion other elements pertaining
to have it dismissed as to why it should be disrrJ.ssed

THE COURT: Well, let r.e indicate something for you

18

so you fully understand it.

19

summons in this case.

20

retained Counsel, and Counsel was representing you.

21

while Counsel was representing you, this motion for summary

22

judgment was file d.

23

opposition to tha t morion for summary judgment, and this matter

24

was heard before your Counsel chose to withdraw

25

You were served with the initial

That is, you were served because you had
Indeed

Your Counsel actually file d a response in

So wheth er your Counsel was informing you of what's
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going on, that may or may not have happened, but you had

2

representation, whatever it was, through this lawyer, whomever

3

he was that you retained, but he was representing you through

4

-- up through and including the time this judgment was entered.

5

So service on your lawyer is service on you.

6

MR. MILLER: Okay.

7

THE COURT: Go to the homestead issue.

8

MR. MILLER: Okay.

9

There —

Yes, your Honor.

Okay.

As you're

aware, your Honor, the homestead is a Constitutional creation,

10

and as such it's not just a privilege, but an absolure right.

11

It's intended to secure and protect the home against creditors

12

as a means of support to every family, and that's found in

13

Kimball versus Salisbury case.

14

Black's Law Dictionary defines a Constitutional

15

homestead as a homestead along with its exemption from forced

16

sale conferred upon the head cf a household by a State

17

Constitution.

18

Constitution outlines that a homestead law needs to be passed.

19

So therefore the homestead law itself is found in code Section

20

78-23-3.

21

Article 22, Section 1 of the Utah State

Now, the term "homestead" is not defined itself in the

22

code section.

23

construction —

24

Webster's and also in Black's Dictionary —

25

homestead is defined as the home, the appurtenances, the out-

However, according to the terms of statutory
you know, we turn to a dictionary, and again in
Law Dictionary

—

1

buildings and the land surrounding the primary residence of a

2

family, a person or his family.
The property located at 3 58 North 100 East is the

3
4

principal residence of my family.

5

in Tooele County Recorder' s Office on March 27 th , 2003.

6

I do not have a copy of that.

7

courtroom

8

that as an official document, your Honor.

9
10
11

The homestead was recorded
Now,

If my wife is present in the

she would have a copy o f that if you want to view

THE COURT: Let's just for this argument assume that i
exists.
MR. MILLER: Okay.

The Utah Supreme Court ruled that

12

the exemption statutes are to be liberally construed in favor

13

of the debtor to protect him and his family from hardship, and

14

that was stated in Russell M. Miller Company versus Given.

15

Also, in the Court case Folson versus Asper they

16

stated that because homestead is a Constitutional creation,

17

all laws thereto must be liberally construed to protect it

18

and make it effective for the dependent and the help -- the

19

dependent and helpless to insure them shelter and support.

20

Again, in Pentagopoiis versus Manning, they said

21

that the law should be broadly construed to accomplish its

22

beneficent purpose.

23

In the case of McMurdie versus Chugg, one of the

24

beneficent purposes to the homestead was given when it said

25

that the law was to protect rhe land which was designated

-101
2

homestead against forced sale for an ordinary judgment lien.
Subsection 3 of the law of Section 78-23-3 clearly

3

states, "A homestead is exempt from jua_cial lien and from

4

levy, execution or forced sale."

5

in the dictionary about the homestead, :: said it would be the

6

house, out-buildings and adjoining lane owned and occupied by a

7

person or family as a primary residence is exempt from judicial

8

lien and from levy, execution and forced sale.

9

Apply_ng the definition found

There are four exemptions that are given to which

10

a homestead could be levied.

11

property raxes and assessments on the property.

12

judgment is not for those.

13

A security interest m

One is a statutory lien for
Plaintiffs

the property and judicial liens

14

for debts created for the purchase price of the property.

15

Again, the plaintiff's judgment is not for that purpose.

16

Three, judicial liens, which is what theirs is,

17

obtained on debts created by failure to provide support or

18

maintenance for dependent children.

19

lien for uhe support of dependent children, or maintenance.

20

The_rs is not a judicial

Four, consensual liens obtained on debts created by

21

mutual contract, and there's nothing consensual about the

22

plaintiff's lien on the property, so that exemption does not

23

apply there.

So none of the exemptions as stated m

24

cover that —

the plaintiff's judgment.

25

the law

Now, up to this point I've onlv talked aoout the
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beneficent purpose which is to provide security and protecting

2

a family's home against the creditors, but there's another

3

element of the law, and that is that of the homestead amount.

4

While the Courts have ruled that the homestead is

5

protected, they have also stated that a homestead cannot be

6

used to defeat a lien that's already on rhe property.

7

and there is a Court case —

8

Chugg.

9

Okay,

and that was in McMurdie versus

Now, there is also a case wnere the Utah Supreme

10

Court allowed the a sale of the homestead, but still granted

11

the exemption amount, which —

12

homestead appear that it is an amount, not the homestead.

13

was m

14

that case are totally different.

okay, which tends to make the
That

the Court case of Gilroy versus Lowe, but the facts of

15

In that case a judgment was awarded against the Lowes,

16

and then eight years l^ter, upon the execution of that judgment

17

and after an order had been issued oy the Court to force sale

18

the property, then they filed the homestead claiming that it

19

was exempt, and a judgment which was eight years later

20

again, after the judgment they filed the nomestead simply as

21

a means to defeating that judgment aid to preserving their

22

home, but they were still granted tne horestead amount because

23

of the homestead law.

24
25

—

THE COURT: And how do you balance this homestead
amount, which is a smail amount —

$20,000 m

the case of the
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primary residence —

2

be subject to execution?

3

against the rest of what might otherwise
That is, the home itself.

MR. MILLER: That is a very valid point, your Honor,
and I would like to emphasize that point in this —

5

time, because the Tenth Circuit Court around 1994 in the case

6

David Dorsey Distributing versus Sanders stated that a judgment

7

lien never attaches to the homestead.

8

homestead under Utah law.

9

at

zhis

4

It never attaches to the

Now, there's another case called Gisey Walker Company

10

versus Biggs where again they talk about where the exemption

11

amount is lower than the value of the property and say that it

12

could be sold at a forued sale.

13

law at that time which was m

14

that a homestead could be levied in excess.

15

been dropped from the present statute that there no longer can

16

be that.

17

However, it referred to the

force, which specifically stated
That wording has

Now, the Courts have had to weigh the differences to

18

what is the beneficent purpose of the honeszead and what is an

19

actual use of the homestead m

20

and the people, and m

21

allowed for the execution of the homestead, m

22

cases the homestead was filed after the judgment, and it was

23

filed after the writ of execution had been g_ven, and it was

24

only used as a means to defeat that execution.

25

However, m

protecting a family and a home

the particular cases where they have
each of those

other Court cases sucr. as —

as I
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mentioned —

2

Court ruled that the plaintiff could not assert a lien against

3

an existing homestead already vested in the defendant.

4

could not do that under the Constitution.

5

assert the lien against an existing homestead.

6

in McMurdie versus Chugg, it talks that —

the

That he

Meaning he couldn't

It was later ruled that the right to claim a homestead

7

exemption is a right that the head of family may assert to

8

prevent sale under execution of his homestead at any time

9

before sale of the premises, unless the claim against such

10

property has been previously asserted and actually adjudicated

11

against him.

12

versus Gardner.

13

they can assert that any time prior to the sale as long as it

14

hasn't been adjudicated.

15

That was found in Utah Builder's Supply Company
So what they have —

the Court has ruled that

Now, as I stated, in all of the cases where the

16

homestead was executed —

17

understand, a lot.

18

used that, and the Court of Appeals has also said that it' s not

19

fair for a person to continue living in their home and enjoy

20

that living, and then declare bankruptcy while all of those

21

other creditors have been left to hang dry out in the wind, and

22

defraud them of that money.

23

and they use it in bankruptcy, as I

I'm not familiar with that, but they have

Now, finally, the Utah Supreme Court ruled in Payson

24

Exchange Savings Bank versus Teachen that the levy of execution

25

upon a homestead is not voidable, but it's absolutely void.
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Now, in our case the homestead was prepared and filed prior to

2

any judgment and without any atrempt on our part or the parr of

3

my wife to defeat any existing lien.

4
5

THE COURT: When did you say the date of that filing
was?
MR. MILLER: The date of the filing was the 26th day

6

That was the dare that she filed —

or 27th day

7

of March 2003.

8

of March.

9

sooner, but the property was in such bad condition from renters

She signed it on the 2 6tQ.

She would have done it

10

having been in there and left ir unsecured and such, that she

11

spent about four, five months trying to prepare the house to

12

make it just habitable.

13

she could move in, she filed the declararion of homestead.

14

in an attempt to defeat any judgment.

15

escape any creditors, but as a protection so that she might

16

have a place to live.

17

So as soon as it was habitable and

We had a house previously.

Not

Nor in an attempt to

A fire burned it.

It was

18

then foreclosed upon, as the insurance company or the bank

19

refused to allow the money ro fix the house to be released.

20

don't know all of the details and the parriculars because I was

21

in prison at the time that that occurred, but we did lose that.

22

So after that time, we looked and this house was available

23

for her to move into, and she prepared it ro move into.

24

again, as I said, it was nor —

25

her, to provide stability for the family, and to provide for

I

Now,

it was to provide stability to
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1

her.

2

this

Then another event has just recent!Ly occurred m

3

Court, your Honor, where this past ' rhursday i received a copy

4

of an Drder of separate maintenance from this Court which was

5

for my wife Lo ri, and it granted to her the use of the P^ operty

6

located at 358 North 100 East as an award of alimony for her,

7

and in reviewing the exemption statute, as well as Rule 69 of

8

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, property thar is necessary

9

for support, such as alimony —

and that is found m

78-23-6

10

child support, et cetera is exempt from execution.

11

was given to her by the Court as alimony for her to live in.

12

Again, another reason not just for the homestead, but for the

13

alimony as well.

14

from levy of the property located there at 358 North M a m .

15

—

T m s home

Therefore, this also creates an exemption

Now, there is a second piece of property listed

m

16

the (inaudible) that was a smaller, little lot "chat is located

17

at about 280 South M a m Street here m

18

a primary residence, so therefore the execution amount: of

19

homestead r as we had talked earlier, would appl y to this , and

20

under the statute it can have a maximum executi on

21

maximum execution , but a statutory exemption of $10, 000 per

22

household

23

As state d m

Tooele.

This is not

—- or not a

my request for the h e a r m g, the is x

24

appraisal that I had last seen on it was for $4 ,000.

25

the value of that piece o f property is sufficiently low tnat

Sc t^at
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it would also exempt it from levy.

2

should be levied under this case and then the homestead granted

3

based under the exemption amount for that, then, you know, I

4

have no objection :o having that property sold at that point

5

at this time, is my

6
7

If the Court deems that it

—

THE C0UR7: Is there a homestead exemption that's been
declared and filed on that property?

8

MR. MILLER: As I understand, your Honor, yes, sir.

9

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

10

MR. MILLER: So in summary

11

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

12

—

—
(Inaudible).

I will now

hear from Mr. White.

13

MR. MILLER: Can I make a summary, your Honor?

14

THE COURT: No.

15

MR. MILLER: Okay.

16

THE COURT: I think you've pretty well (inaudible).

17

MR. WHITE: Thank you, your Honor, and I compliment

18

Mr. Miller for doing his homework on this case.

I would like

19

to add a couple of facts that he has left out.

20

he has indicated that the law is that the homestead exemption,

21

as powerful as it night be cannot be used to offset or take

22

preference to a lien that's already recorded on the property.

23

I read most of the cases that he cited.

24

much dispute.

25

few of them, but let me just indicate a couple of facts to the

In particular

I really don't have

His interpretation I think is a little off on a
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Court, and I think that we can straighten that out.

2

Number one, as 10 his question about the judgment of

3

$271,000, if Mr. Miller adds up m e amounrs owed to my clients,

4

which are in the judgment, Jerry Houghton and Sue Houghton were

5

granted a judgment j o m r l y and severely of $88,129.

6

and Mrs. Thomas, Marlene and Kendall, were granted a judgment

7

of $183,269, which roughly figured $271,000 with the interest

8

up to that point m

9

Mr. Thomas

tire.

Addressing the motion to set aside the judgment, I

10

don't believe anything m

11

in time to have it set aside.

12

all of the commumcaiicr.s and pleadings and whatnot that went

13

on before were sent to Mr. A t k m , his attorney.

14

cited correctly that Mr. A t k m rade a response to the summary

15

judgment.

16

irregularities there m a r I am aware of.

17

about two weeKs later and since m a t time I've been sending

18

everything to Mr. Miller.

19

there is justification at this point
Lie Court correctly stated that

The Court

The Court granted it under Rule 4.501.

There was no

Mr. A t k m withdrew

THE COURT: An^ I can make that ruling now.

That is,

20

I'll deny the motion m

21

service, given the fact rhat Counsel was present at the time,

22

retained by Mr. Miller, and indeed filed motions m

23

to this question aboui judgment.

24
25

set aside the judgment based upon non-

MR. WHITE: Tnank you.

opposition

Now, addressing the homestead

issues, Mr. Miller has reen convicted of defrauding abour. 200
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people to the tune of about: 8 or $9,000,000.

2

part and parcel of that.

3

in fact filed in the case originally was because he pled guilty

4

to 10 or 11 counts of fraud.

5

My judgments are

The reason the summary judgment was

That conviction was entered in this Court through

6

the summary judgment process, and hence, he is personally

7

responsible for those amounts.

8

understand that amount.

9

juste type of res judicata argument, but I think the Court

I'm sure that he may not

I -hink that's the basis of his res

10

will note that that is not exactly how that rule works.

11

fact, the criminal case in -hat matter has also ordered

12

restitution, and any one of those defendants purportedly ai

13

some point in time may go afrer his property.

14

In

Here's the facts rhat rhe Court: ought to know, that

15

I'm sure that Mr. Miller is not aware of.

First of all, when

16

we filed —

17

Thomases, we also filed and obtained a motion for a prejudgment

18

writ of attachment because cf the allegations of fraud, and

19

because Mr. Miller had filed and recorded with the County

20

Recorder's Office a document indicating that he was no longer

21

to be considered a resident of the Stare of Utah, and because

22

he was charged with fraud, that gave Judge Young the basis to

23

go ahead and grant a writ of attachment on the property rhat

or I filed the complaint for the Houghtons and the

24

THE COURT: When was thar writ issued?

25

MR. WHITE: Your Honor, the morion was filed in

—
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November of 2000, and the order was actually

2

of 2001.

si gned

April 17*h

I have a copy of the order.

3

THEi COURT: I don't need that.

4

MR. WHITE: Instead of looking through your file,

5

IT:

was sign<Bd on April 17th, 2001 by Judge Young •

6

THEi COURT: Why don't you give It tO th e bailiff and

7 ! that way we' 11 at 1 east have —
8
9

MR. WHITE: Which includes the house he was currently
residing m

at 871 East Upland Drive, the 358 North house, and

10

the little piece of property that there's nothing on.

11

virtually a weed patch in an alleyway.

12

It's

We know that, and I purport to ihe Court that those

13

were the properties that I worked with tne SEC attorneys to

14

exclude from their case m

15

funds of his fraud to those properties, and those properties

16

were solely in his name.

17

them.

18

Salt Lake.

They did not trace any

Not even his wife's name were on

So we asked the Court m

this County to issue that

19

writ.

20

we wanted to make sure that those weren' t deeded away or

21

squandered away somehow in between.

22

Because of all of the problems that Mr. Miller had,

Now, that becomes of critical importance.

23

add, the writ of attachment —

24

attachment whicn was filed with the Court as well.

25

I might

that's the order, the writ of

THE COURT: You're saying this prejudgment writ of
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1

att achment was f:_ r-st in t:.me over a homestead exemption.

2

MR. WHITE : At tha*t

3

THE COURT : And tr.e homestead exemption is really b e m g

4

fil sd to def.raud

5
6

reditors

MR. WHIT E : Well,

T' m

not sure that he understood the

meaning of that.

7

THE COURT: Sure.

8

MR. WHITE: I'm net saying that he did that, but I am

9

citing a corpus juris secundum m

which it states, "Obligations

10

existing prior to rhe establishment of the homestead right will

11

not be defeated wr.ere the debtor subsequently claimed that the

12

premise was his homestead."

13

Chugg case, which is a Utah case.

14

In fact, that case cited is the

It further states that the rule —

excuse me —

that

15

the exemption canno t be claimed as against valid liens which

16

have attached to tne premises before they are impressed with

17

the homestead chara cter, wr.ether such liens are obtained by

18

contract or by oper ation of law.

19

I would suggest to tne Court, and I have a reference

20

for that, the rules applied m

21

by —

these cases of liens are created

liens created by attachment.

I have

—

22

THE COURT: Of course, this is a post-judgment

23

MR. WHITE: Yes.

24

THE COURT: —

25

MR. WHITE: And I have a case en that as well.

attachment.

—
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THE COURT: Okay.

2

MR. WHITE: The Chugg case, which is an older case,

3

simply states that existing liens on property cannot be

4

defeated by subsequently claiming the property is a homestead.

5

Now, that's important because what Mr. Miller said, he was

6

living, his wife was living, all his dependents were living at

7

8 91.

8

—

There was a fire.

They never fixed it up.

Whatever the

it was later foreclosed upon.

9

In fact, several months prior to that time he called

10

me and asked me if I would subrogate our preattachment judge

11

—

12

I agreed to do that.

13

that that actually never did take place, but we did sign the

14

documents and whatnot, in fact, to do that.

15

that house when he was living there with his wife and with his

16

dependents.

or lien, so that he could go ahead and refinance the house.

17

He tells me today for the first time

So our lien was on

He tells me today he was actually incarcerated on

18

March 27 th , 2002.

19

reasons.

20

year before he even went to jail, and he was still residing in

21

that house.

22

months later in December, and in fact it was foreclosed on

23

after that.

24
25

Now, that date's important for obvious

Our lien was against the house April 17"h, 2001, a

The house caught fire six months later, or seven

Now, the important part is this.
let's make this point first.

Mrs. Killer —

well,

Mr. Miller has never occupied
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the premises.

2
3

THE COURT: Right, and she wasn't occupying the
premises.
MR. WHITE: And sne

4

wasn't occupying the premises and

5

she took occupancy approximately about three months ago, in

6

May.

7

MR. MILLER: No.

8

MR. WHITE: May, June, July, approximately three months

9

ago she took occupancy.

He told me that they starred fixing it

10

up sometime last September.

11

take.

12

trumps the homestead filing of March.

13

it.

14

It doesn't matter which date you

The lien was still on there two years ago, and that lien
There's no doubt about

THE COURT: Is it the Chugg case that you used for

15

support on this, or is it some other case for a prejudgment

16

writ of attachment?

17

MR. WHITE: That's another case, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Okc.y.

While —

I'd like to cite one other

19

one before I get to that, on the occupancy, because that is

20

interrelated with it.

21

is a Utah case, specifically talks about occupancy and the

22

homestead, and I'm quoting, "It is the occupancy of the

23

premises that gives rise ro the homestead claim."

24

occupy it in order to make the claim.

25

The Sanders versus Sanders case, which

They must

The prejudgment writ is the case of Ephra.m versus
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1

Davis, which is a 1978 case, and I'm citing

2

here now.

3

service c f the writ of attachment the def sndant creditor was

4

deprived of significant prop erty inte resr .

5

seizure by the sheriff encumbered the property with the lien

6

of attachment and inhibited defendant' s right to dispose or

7

encumber of its assets."

8
9

— and I'm quoting

It says, "In the instant case, upon issuance and

The constructive

Now, I can tell you in this case they did let the
homestead come in, but only because the sheriff didn't do

10

the service correctly, and they got rid of the lien, but the

11

premise —

12

would in fact be first in time, first in right, and that's the

13

basis of that case.

14

the principal is the same, that that is a lien that

Furthermore ou that case it says, "The prejudgment

15

remedy of attachment allows the deprivation of the property.

16

The debtor's property is therefore subject to the principals

17

embodied," and it goes on.

18

Now, let me talk about the smaller piece of property.

19

There's a small piece of property over cff cf Main.

20

access is through a back alleyway.

21

believe.

22

that —

23

It's only

It is 43 feet by 190, I

Also in agreement with Mr. Miller that thai: case or
there's not a house on it.
Although the code allows people ro select in more than

24

one location, the cases are very clear or. that, that in fact

25

the property, if it's appurtenant to —

doesn't mean attached
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to.

Could be in different areas —

2

related to the maintenance or the support of the family.

3

has to be m

some way

This little piece of property is in the back of an

4

alleyway.

5

oiled over.

6

attaches this property that the SEC took and it's behind

7

another person's house right now.

8

for money.

9

possible to claim in either instance that this comes under the

10

homestead exemptions, =md we would ask the Court that it no: be

11

included.

12

It's a weed patch right now.

It should have been

Mr. Miller had an interest in the building that:

It has never been leased

It's never been rented for money.

There is no way

Now, Mr. Miller in his declaration actually filed by

13

his wife —

14

claims the house is worth $85,000.

15

Even if the Court found that there was some homestead exemption

16

there, my clients would be entitled to the excess

17

that there is no question.

18

the Court have a copy of that with his motion

—

Our judgment is $260,000.

I do challenge Mrs. Miller's calculation.

amount.

To

The current

19

statute which was amended m

2000 allows, and only allows

20

$20,000 per individual.

21

credit —

22

then they're really only entitled in my view to $20,000, but in

23

fairness and candidness to the Court as well, I found one ca.se

24

that said if she was m

25

on the title of it, m

Now, if individual is defined as tne

or the debtor, which Mr. Miller is, not Mrs. Miller,

possession of it, even though she's not
the liberal construction of it, the
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Courts would probably g r a n her an exemption as well, giving

2

them 40, totally maximum, out

3

the house, and mark it or impress it with the homestead until

4

after that house caught fire and was foreclosed on.

5

about two years difference.

6

she did not take possession of

Clearly

I observed the house before I filed the motion in

7

November of 2000.

It was totally dilapidated, had been an

8

older rental house, the doors in the front and the back were

9

totally open on it.

No one was residing there, really, at all,

10

and I don't know that anybody's been in there since they've

11

tried to go in and fix it ^p now for her.

12

The point there c e m g at the time our prejudgment

13

lien was filed, it was nor a homestead to the Millers, period.

14

Likewise, the little piece of property in the alleyway was not

15

either, and that should nor be considered as a homestead as

16

well.

17

I have with me tcday and I would proffer as testimony

18

an attorney that deals wit.i these exemptions m

19

Court routinely, and he is Mr. Kurt Morris, he would hear

20

he is here and he would testify that the exemption is $40,000

21

max per household.

22

bankruptcy
—

What they did is calculate $20,000 per individual, but

23

they included in their calculation all the children.

Under the

24

new statute amendments of 2000 that's no longer permissible.

25

What they did is increase tne exemption from $10,000 to $20,000
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and basically took the kids out.

2

little bit before that, but nevertheless, that's the maximum.

3

He's claimed 100 —

The kids were out actually a

or she's claimed $120,000, and

4

that can't be done under that statute, and I would cite for

5

that 78-23-3(2) (a) (l) , which indicates there is a $40,000

6

maximum exemption there.

7

versus Miller case, which indicates the maximum would be

8

$40,000.

9

I would also cite the Homeside

So all in all, your Honor, we have a very valid

10

prejudgment writ of attachment.

11

proceed on when this was started.

12

I gave IT: to you —

13

Honor?

14

15
16

It's that which we wish to
I, have a copy of —

the title report.

maybe

Did you have that, your

THE COURT: Oh, yes, I do.

The list of lien holders

MR. WHITE: Showing that —

yeah.

and —
Showing that the

17

writ was filed and recorded with the courthouse about two years

18

before tnis house ever came on the radar screen as far as being

19

a Homestead Act, and I would suggest to the Court that the

20

Court rule in fact that the prejudgment writ of attachment is

21

not affected by the Homestead Act.

22

to sell this house and the other little piece of property m

23

attempt to try and recoup some of their $271,000.

24
25

My clients have the right
an

I appreciate Mr. Miller's response to this matter, but
I think that he just doesn't understand the fact that

m
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1

Utah, first in time, first in right.

2

reasonable interpretation of the time periods and the way the

3

law works with liens and homesteads that I could suggest to the

4

Court that would construe that statute any other way, and we

5

would ask the Court to permit us to go ahead, readvertise and

6

go ahead with the sell.

7
8

I den't see any other

Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay.

This is what the Court's going to

do, based upon the arguments today.

9

MR. MILLER: Can I get —

your Honor?

10

THE COURT: Yes.

11

MR. MILLER: May I add something to what he has said?

12

THE COURT: How much of a something do you want to add?

13

MR. MILLER: Well, some of the things that he stated as

14

facts that I'd like to clarify and

15

THE COURT: Okay.

16
17
18

—

Let's make it —

let's make it

quick.
MR. MILLER: Okay, he stated that Z have been convicted
of defrauding people.

That is not correct, your Honor.

19

THE COURT: Well, you pled guilty to

20

MR. MILLER: I pled gui-ity —

—

I did not plead guilty to

21

defrauding any people.

22

The Court in Salt Lake that I have —

23

it today rhat I could proffer hLere as evider_ce pertaining to

24

the things which he has stated.

25

I have an affidavit which I filed in
happer: to have a copy c>f

As far as restitution, there was ar. order of the Court
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that said "restitution as necessary."

2

of restitution ordered.

3

specifies how to determine restitution.

I have not agreed to

4

any amount of restitution in that case.

There are issues in my

5

affidavit which would address that, if the Court would want me

6

to go over it now or not as far as being responsible.

7

38 —

There was no amount

or 78-38 —

or 77-38 (a)-302

The law states that if the criminal conviction

8

specifically assigns liability that is applicable in a civil

9

case.

The things which I pled guilty to, I did not plead

10

guilty, and in my plea I did not agree to pay restitution to

11

all of the victims "chat had been listed and had been talked to

12

by the prosecutor.

13

In my plea agreement I agreed to state, and it is

14

stated in the plea agreement that I would make restitution

15

to the parties of the lawsuit.

16

were the State of Utah and Glen E. Miller.

17

restitution for the fact that that is who the parties were.

18

In the preliminary hearing I was questioning Mr. Houghton

19

pertaining to the loss of money and how he had gotten a

20

judgment, and the Judge said, u Mr. Miller, Mr. Houghton is not

21

a plaintiff in that, and you are not to discuss loss of money."

22

THE COURT: Yes, but Mr. Miller, you have to understand

The parties in the lawsuit
I agreed to that

23

that individual parties can't bring criminal actions against

24

people.

25

The State does, and the State represents the people.
MR. MILLER: I understand, but this is —

this case,
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1

the prosecut or stat ed that the victim was the State, and I have

2

that in my a ffidavi t.

4

the victims

THE COURT: Well, the <victim represent —

3

are rep resented by uhe Sta te.
MR. MILLER : Okay, and so the re' s an issue th ere still

5
6

pertaining to the restitution amount.

7

attachment, let's —

8

March, okay?

9

judgment was not awarded until April 10th.

okay.

The prejudgment writ of

My wife moved into the house in

Which was prior to the post-judgment time.

I did not even know

10

until, like I said, I received the writ of execution, that

11

there was even a judgment.

12

The

A prejudgment writ of attachment, while I am not fully

13

versed in title and claims, that is a pre-writ.

14

lien that has been adjudicated, as was stated in —

15

property until April 10th, when that claim would become official

16

and adjudicated.

17

That is not a
against the

I would also like to say that, you know, this —

in

18

this case to awarding the execution of the writ of execution,

19

and continuing on wirh that, is just like having a person who

20

gives up 20 years of her life to have —

21

raise —

22

—

23

she is left with nothing, and then they come in and sell the

24

house which she has and has been awarded by this Court as

25

alimony, to kicking her out on the street and saying, "Here is

raise a family, to

to support her husband, and then all of a sudden he is

you know, he abandons her, and if he abandons her and then
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$40,000, whatever, for your inconvenience, and we're sorry "

2

Furthermore, it does authorize that the wife, and the

3

spouse may assert the homestead cla.m as well, on behalf of the

4

husband and the family, m

5

of the

6
7

I think I have a copy

—
THE COURT: Well, the starve is quite clear that the

maximum amount is $40,000.

8
9

Section 12.

MR. MILLER: Yes, but the statute is also verv clear
—

and the Tenth Circuit Court ma King it also clear that a writ

10

of —

11

homestead, and that a homestead, nor a homestead amount, is not

12

subject to the levy, as also is trie alimony as well.

13

or that a judgment of judicial lien does not attach to a

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

Okay, thank you, Mr. Miller.

14

to the motion to set aside the judgrent, I've already ruled

15

on that particular issue.

16

order.

17

Mr. Wnite, if you'll prepare the

This Court's going to fine that the maximum amount

18

per household is $40,000 m

19

right of homestead to $40,000.

20

of findings that the writ of attachment was filed somewhere

21

in the neighborhood of two years prior to the filing of the

22

homestead lien.

23

As

this case.

So I'd limit any

I'll also find for purposes

Be that as it may, the Cert's going to take at

24

least the opportunity to look at Epnraim versus Davis and

25

Sanders versus Sanders to see what it says associated with a
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prejudgrnent writ of attachment acting as the appropriate lie-

2

that might otherwise be reflected in the homestead exemption.

3

So that I might make a determination associated with whether

4

or not a writ of attachment, as you have represented it to ce,

5

acts m

6

exemption.

7

that particular issue.

8
9

the case of cutting off any claim for a homestead
I'm going to ask Ms. Walton ultimately to look at

So I will give that file to you to check.

I know rr.at

probably gives you, Mr. White, some heartburn associated wii-

10

under advisement, s m c a you and I have a matter that's under

11

advisement that we've been attempting to get in touch with yoa

12

about on that other matter; Iverson versus Iverson.

13

MR. WHITE: Yes.

14

(Court addresses issue unrelated to this case.)

15

THE COURT: I do understand that it is a matter that is

16

still on my desk and it will be off my desk by the end of tr.is

17

week, as well as this one.

18

arguments today.

19

your materials, because it was well done.

20

So Mr. Miller, I appreciate your

I would also say that I appreciated reading

You've represented yourself better than the lawyer .<r.o

21

you asked to represent you, but I held the motion to set asice

22

a judgment, I denied that motion based upon the fact that yc_

23

had a Counsel representing you.

24

or not communicating with you at that time, he was still a

25

lawyer of record who had also filed an objection to this ver\

Whether he was communicating
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motion, and simply didn't keep you in that particular loop.

2

On the issue associated with the writ of execution,

3

I've taken that issue under advisement, having limited the

4

upper amount of $40,000 to it, to simply whether or not the

5

writ of attachment exists.

6

As to the other property, that property is subject to

7

execution, the smaller parcel, based upon the arguments of

8

Counsel today.

9

having looked at Chugg and Sanders a prejudgment writ of

10

attachment is firs:: in time over a homestead exemption.

11
12

So the only issue that I have is whether or not

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, what about pertaining to the
exemption for alimony?

13

THE COURT: I've ruled on that.

My ruling is it's

14

not appropriate or applicable based upon the way I read the

15

statute.

Okay, thank you.

16

MR. MILLER: Thank you, your Honor.

17 I

(Hearing concluded.)

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
:
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, :
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
:
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,
:
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
Case No. 000301127

vs.

:
:
:

GLEN E. MILLER,

:

Judge Randall N. Skanchy

Defendant,

:

This matter came on for hearing on various motions on August 4,2003. Mr.
Douglas F. White representing plaintiffs and Glen E. Miller appearing pro se. After a
review of the pleadings, case law, and argument of the parties, the court finds and orders
as follows:
FINDINGS
1. A prejudgment Writ of Attachment was filed against the real property in
question and was granted on March 26,2001.
2. A judgment was entered on April 10,2003 against Glen Miller in this matter.
3. Lori Miller, the wife of defendant, filed a declaration of homestead on the subject
property on March 26,2003, and she either took occupancy of the property in March or
May of 2003.

-24. A Writ of Execution was issued on May 1, 2003, and a sale of the property
subject to execution was scheduled for July 23, 2003.
5. Defendant filed a request for hearing on the Writ of Execution and the court
ordered a stay of execution, pending hearing on July 22,2003.

LEGAL DISCUSSION
—

m -

The court notes that the case of Sanders v. Cassitv. 586 P.2d 423 (Utah 1978) is
dispositive on the issue of whether a homestead exemption may defeat a pre-existing Writ
of Attachment or other judgment on the property claimed under the homestead exemption.
Under the statutory authority of Utah Code Annotated 78-23-1 et. seq., and the Sanders
decision, a homestead exemption may be made at any time after judgment and before sale.
Plaintiffs argument that a prejudgment Writ of Attachment, (or judgment for that matter)
filed before the homestead exemption on the subject property was declared, compromised
the efficacy of the homestead exemption, is as unpersuasive today as it was to the Utah
Supreme Court twenty five years ago. That court opined back then that " . . . the
homestead exemption is immune from judgment lien, execution or forced sale, providing a
formal declaration of the existing exemption is made prior to the time set for sale or
execution," Id. at 426 (emphasis added). Furthermore, even though the Millers may not
have been in occupancy on the property at the time of the prejudgment Writ of
Attachment, or at the time of judgment, is irrelevant, as the statute neither requires such in
order to declare the exemption and Utah case law recognizes that occupancy is
unnecessary. Rich Cooperative Ass'n v. Dustin, 385 P.2d 155 (Utah 1963)

-3-

ORDER
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the subject property, 358 North 100
East, Tooele, Utah, is subject to the homestead exemption exercised by the Millers and
exempted up to $40,000.00 per Utah Code Annotated 78-23-3(2)(b)(ii). Mr. White to
prepare the order consistent with this decision.
Dated this

1

day of August, 2003.

Randall N. SKanchy
District Court Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

r~
i^\,-A-W'r

JERRY HOUGHTON,

B

Plaintiff,
Case No. 000301127

vs .
GLEN E. MILLER,

Defendant.

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
December 4, 2003

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE RANDALL N, SKANCHY
Third District Court Judge

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff;

DOUGLAS F.
3282 South
Bountiful,
Telephone:

For the Defendant:

JUDSON T. PITTS
(Address not provided)
(Phone number not provided)

Transcribed by: Eeverly Lowe, CSR/CCT

19C9 South Washington Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 377-0027

WHITE
Sunset Hollow Dr.
Utah 84010
(435)843-9399

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on December 4, 2C93)

3

THE COURT: All right.

We'll call the matter of

4

Jerry Houghton and others versus Glen E. Miller.

5

000301127.

6

of appearance.

Iz is case

Counsel, if you'll come forward, make your entries

7

MR. WHITE: Douglas White for the plaintiff.

8

THE COURT: All right.

9

MR. PITTS: Judson Pitts.

10

THE COURT: Mr. Pitts, this is

11

MR. PITTS: 9946, for the defendant.

12

THE COURT: I think this is your motion.

13

—

So you may

proceed.

14

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, at this time, again, with the

15

understanding that I was retained just a little while ago, and

16

I've looked over the motions, the response to motions, I was

17

unclear as to the scope as to all that would be discussed

18

during the hearing today.

19

20

THE COURT: Well, then you're not alone, because so am

I.

21

MR. PITTS: Okay.

22

THE COURT: But I know that we have voluminous —

I

23

believe wnat is at issue today is the objection to plaintiff's

24

order.

25

MR. PITTS: Okay.

-3
1 I

THE COURT: But I know there are other motions that

2

have been filed, including a motion or request thar I take

3

judicial notice of various items.

4

MR. PITTS: Sure.

5

THE COURT: That may simply be a reflection of somebody

6

trying to practice law who has never been through law school

7

training, but having said that, seemed to have done a pretty

8

good job of representing himself so far.

9

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I'd like to beg the Court's

10

indulgence at this time for my client that he might have one

11

hand free so that he can take some notes.

12
13

THE COURT: That's not up to me.

That's up to the

officers in the courtroom today.

14

OFFICER: If it's up to us, the answer is no.

15

THE COURT: What I ask is do you have any objection to

16

that?

If you don't, then —

well, let's just do this.

17

free one hand, whichever hand he uses to write with.

Let's

18

MR. MILLER: R^ght.

19

THE COURT: I've always considered the security of the

20

courtroom to be not the province of the Judge but the province

21

of the security officers in the courtroom.

22

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, it appears that my client,

23

the defendant, has issued a motion or made a motion ro object

24

to the levy and the execution that has been issued by the

25

plaintiffs in this case, based upon his —

the granting by
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this Court of the homestead exemption back on August 4"-h, I

2

believe it was, of this year, in that hearing when that came

3

before the Court.

4

make some oral argument about that to clarify our position.

5

We would like at this time to go ahead and

THE COURT: Go ahead, certainly.

6

served by standing at the lectern so that

7

MR. PITTS: (Inaudible).

8

THE COURT: —

9
10

You might best be
—

for purposes of the record it would be

better recorded that way.
MR. PITTS: My client has gone ahead and moved in

11

this case according to the Utah Constitutional provision or.

12

homestead, Article 22, Section 1, your Honor, and also pursuant

13

to Utah Code 78-23-3, that the statutory language in that

14

situation be read liberally —

15

him to exclude his homestead.

16

be construed liberally, to allow

Now, I understand there are more than —

there is more

17

than one parcel of land that is involved in this case that he

18

would like to exclude his homestead and also the other parcel

19

of land using various statutory provisions from forced sale and

20

the execution of levy in this case.

21

Your Honor, we would go ahead and enter in argument

22

at this time that the provisions of the code that provide

23

apply to the homestead exemption as it is set forth apply in

24

a setting that is for bankruptcy law.

25

—

We would like to go ahead and move at this time thai:
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1

the homestead definition as it is put forth in statutory

2

language should be interpreted differently in this situation,

3

should be distinguished from the context of a bankruptcy

4

proceeding.

5

That the statutory language should be read more

6

liberally to protect the actual physical structure of rhe

7

homestead in this situation, as differentiated from the

8

bankruptcy.

9

Now, it's my understanding in a bankruptcy proceeding

10

that it is common practice, your Honor, to go ahead and grant

11

the exemption up to $20,000 per person in the household, which

12

would give a total monetary exemption on the homestead of

13

$40,000, and that the rest of the —

14

structure would be subject to a creditor's lien, and would be

15

able to be sold at execution in a sheriff's sale; and that the

16

proceeds from the sale up to $40,000 would be given over to the

17

defendants or the debtors in that situation.

18

the actual physical

We enter an argument at this time that that does

19

not apply in this proceeding.

20

Constitutional proceeding, based on an older law and an older

21

law and an older interpretation of homestead outside of that

22

context of bankruptcy, and that the entire structure at this

23

time is not subject to a forced sale.

24
25

That this proceeding is a

We use case law, your Honor, to back up and to support
our point.

First off I'd like to say Russell M. Miller Company
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versus Given, the citation in that case, your Honor

2

THE COURT: I have it.

3

MR. PITTS: You have the citation.

—

That exemption

4

statute is to be liberally construed in favor of the debtor

5

to protect he and his family.

6

Folson versus Asper as one of the first cases to deal with

7

homestead at the beginning of this century, that all laws of

8

the homestead should be liberally construed to protect it and

9

make it effective for the dependent and the helpless, to insure

10
11

We also would like to cite

their shelter and their support.
Now, defendant recognizes at this point, your Honor,

12

that the exemption as it was created and cut out has changed

13

over time by legislative change, but we would also like to

14

recognize that the amount —

15

exemption in times past historically have been enough to cover

16

the value of most homesteads.

17

monetary amount of the homestead

As that law has evolved, your Honor, we understand

18

that the price most homesteads in equity has exceeded the

19

value of the homestead exemption for Utah.

20

in a national context that this state has one of the lowest

21

thresholds of any state in the country at this time monetarily

22

for a homestead exemption.

23

I understand

Regardless of that argument, and also recognizing,

24

your Honor, that the homestead exemption law in this state

25

was altered just six years ago in 1996 by the legislature,
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1

that the values were changed, that this was dealt with by the

2

legislature in terms of legislative history, again, the last

3

40 years of homestead lav/ have been almost exclusively caught

4

up in creditor/debtor situations in a bankruptcy proceeding.

5

Now, one of the cases that I wanted to cite as well,

6

your Honor, that I think will help clarify my argument, will

7

be —

8

to take notice of the definition of Black's Law Dictionary on

9

homestead.

well, first off, I -wanted to go ahead and ask the Court

That is that the house out-buildings and adjoining

10

land owned and occupied by a person or family as a primary

11

residence, Black's Law Dictionary speaks of the house, the

12

out-buildings, the adjoining land as being a part of the

13

homestead.

14

We argue that when the cases and the statutory

15

language that has been set forth in not only Black's Law

16

Dictionary, but also in the statute 78-23-3, when it talks

17

about a homestead being exempted, we contend that the exemption

18

that that statutory language is talking about isn't the

19

monetary value that is exempted from the forced sale.

20
21
22

THE COURT: If the statute so designates, it's only
exempt up to a certain monetary value.
MR. PITTS: We understand that, but we would like to

23

submit that that is in the bankruptcy proceeding.

We would

24

like to submit that that applies only to bankruptcy cases and

25

it does not apply to situations where a debtor has not filed

1

for bankruptcy and is not in the course of liquidating his

2

assets to satisfy all lien creditors that have come against

3

him.

4

THE COURT: Has there been any case in the State of

5

Utah limiting this particular statute only to a bankruptcy

6

proceeding?

7

MR. PITTS: The cases that I have, your Honor, to cite

8

in that context —

of course, the older cases that I've already

9

provided for; Folson and I'd also present McMurray versus Chugg

10

as a case that was not in that context.

11

beneficient purpose of securing and protecting family's home

12

against creditors.

13

Okay.

Now, I would submit to the Court that the

14

language that's used in those cases —

15

of bankruptcy proceeding cases —

16

against attack by creditors.

17

children.

18
19

They talked about the

and these are outside

talk about securing the home

It talks about protecting minor

It talks about giving support to those people.
THE COURT: The statute itself has a cap at which that

protection ends, and that cap is set forth in a monetary value.

20

MR. PITTS: Okay.

Well, Your Honor, the basis of my

21

argument revolves around this being a property interest, as a

22

Constitutional matter, and not being an interest in a monetary

23

value.

24

attaches in this kind of a situation.

25

violation of due process in a Constitutional manner to go ahead

I would like to make the argument that due process
It would be actually a
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and take away the physical home, the physical structure, in

2

granting this exemption.

3

My client and his spouse did apply for a homestead

4

exemption in this case, and in that context they were asking

5

for the monetary relief m

6

also moved for in that situation, he moved for the protection

7

of a due process protection.

8

that's given under the United —

9

that situation, but what my client

A Constitutional protection
or the Utah Constitution.

Now, I understand that there is not a Utah case

10

exactly on point in this situation.

11

language in those cases and also through the statutory law

12

that's been given, that it is the physical structure that is

13

protected through due process that he has a right to protect

14

and give shelter to his family and to his minor children that

15

are at home, rather than the money that is associated.

16

It is to be inferred by

It is possible, perhaps, on a forced sale for him to

17

go out and to find a home for his family for $40,000 in this

18

kind of situation, but I'm contending that that's not what the

19

leaislat lve intent —

20

m

21

why if m

22

not the policy that these legislators had

mind when they passed this Constitutional provision.

That's

fact it's Constitutional.
THE COURT: If I could synthesize your argument,

23

what you're really saying is in the State of Utah under this

24

homestead exemption, if someone claims it, that takes their

25

hc^ne, whatever equity, whatever value may exist, and makes it
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free and clear, despite the caps that have been set forth in

2

the statute of any judgment, of any judgment creditor.

3

this is a homestead exemption, it would fly against every

4

debtor/creditor relationship that exists in the state.

If

5

MR. PITTS: You know, your Honor, I

—

6

THE COURT: There is an ability for somebody to say,

7

"My home is my castle, and therefore I may do whatever I'll

8

do to incur debt in whatever fashion I do sor

9

touch this," and that's what I read these caps to be.

but you can't
You

10

can't touch it up to $40,000, so that at least somebody can

11

use that exemption for purposes of finding suitable alternative

12

habitation.

13

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I would

14

THE COURT: No one —

no one —

—
it's not your argument.

15

It sounds like it is.

16

this.

17

creditors if the homestead exemption is declared, and can't be

18

touched whether it has a value of $10,000 or $750,000.

19

It sounds like your argument is simply

A man's home is his castle.

It's exempt from judgment

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I agree with the Court's

20

summation of my argument with the exception that in the

21

bankruptcy proceeding there are cases that set forth that the

22

exemption that's granted is an allowance for that.

23

words, in that context they are allowed to have $40,000 or

24

$20,000 a person as an exemption, in liquidating all of their

25

other assets.

In other
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McMurty versus Chuggs set forth that the homestead is

2

a benefit to those people to prelect that castle.

3

words it's a reward for those debtors and creditors who do not

4

take the steps in filing for bankruptcy.

5

What I'm —

In other

the policy argument that I'm making,

6

your Honor, is that folks who have the integrity, debtors who

7

remain and keep the integrity of not declaring bankruptcy to

8

their creditors, that is a show of good faith on their part,

9

regardless of the circumstances that they would like to go

10
11

ahead and repay their debts.
Now, in my defendant's particular case that might be a

12

lot of debts, your Honor.

I understand you've overseen other

13

cases that my defendant has come before you on, but still

14

THE COURT: I actually haven't seen anything.

15

MR. PITTS: Regardless —

—

regardless of that history,

16

your Honor, he has not taken that: step.

17

faith in his situation.

18

as a reward for that, that his wife and his minor children

19

should be granted the opportunity to stay in their home and

20

to not be subject to forced sale, and that the words of the

21

statute should be read as to differentiate between the

22

exemption and the homestead, and that the homestead itself

23

in this situation is a due process Constitutional Right,

24

should be exempt from forced sale.

25

He has shown good

I feel at this time that, you know,

THE COURT: Let me come back and ask this question.

Is
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there any case that you can cite to this Court in the State of

2

Utah that indicates that this exemption merely acts as a lien

3

and the property is not subject, of course, to sale.

4

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I can submit a case again.

It

5

is an older case because I feel that the cases from the last 50

6

years have all been in the bankruptcy proceeding context, but I

7

do go ahead and cite Kimball versus Salisbury.

8

381-53-P-1037.

9

could find that we support for that position in the

10

It's an 1898 case.

That's 17 Utah

I also believe that you

Folson/Asper case.

11

THE COURT: Okay.

12

MR. WHITE: By way of clarification I believe the

13

Well, let's hear from Mr. White.

defendant's motion is simply to object to the order

—

14

THE COURT: And I understand that, but

—

15

MR. WHITE: —

for the record.

16

THE COURT: —

Mr. Miller hasn't been represented

17

by Counsel, and I'm going to give Counsel latitude to make

18

whatever arguments need to be made, including what this is,

19

is in essence a reconsideration of the Court's prior argument

20

—

21

the fact that he's not been represented.

22

or prior ruling.

So give him some latitude here, based upon

MR. WHITE: Thank you.

I understand Mr. Miller's

23

argument, and I'm looking at the document he submitted on

24

October the 9th, 2003.

25

THE COURT: What's that entitled?
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MR. WHITE: It's entitled, "Request for judicial notice

2

of homestead, " which I take as supplemental to his objections

3

to my order.

4

Mr. Miller's idea of protecting the residence, the physical

5

structure from the execution, and to redefine what a homestead

6

is, instead of taking Black's Law, we've got to stick with the

7

statutory definition, which is set forth in Title 78-23

8

THE COURT: Let me just ask a question.

9

In addressing Counsel's argument, and I expect

—

Now, this

Chugg case, McMurty case, and the language associated with

10

those cases all suggest that the homestead exemption exists for

11

purposes of protecting it from being subject to judicial sale.

12

Is this statute a subsequent codification of legislature's

13

issues, intent and otherwise?

14

MR. WHITE: Well, I don't believe —

I think they're

15

mutually exclusive.

I think the case the Court is looking for

16

is here; 19 —

17

that case, which was exactly the same issue being raised here

18

that I researched

the Gilroy case versus Lowe.

I'm citing from

—

19

THE COURT: (Inaudible).

20

MR. WHITE: Exactly, as whether or not the physical

21

structure is safe from the sale as opposed to just the value of

22

the exemption, and here's what the case says.

23

interest in the home therefore exceeds the value of amount of

24

the homestead exemption.

25

circumstances."

"The appellants

A sale is not prohibited in these
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2

THE COURT: The a p p e l l a n t in t h a t case was t h e judgment
creditor?

3

MR. WHITE: Yes.

4

THE COURT: So read that language to me again.

5

MR. WHITE: Pardon?

6

THE COURT: Read that.

7

MR. WHITE: "The appellant was the homestead claimant.,/

8

THE COURT: Okay.

9

MR. WHITE: The appellant's interest in the home

—

10

and one of the things that probably should have been done is

11

they have some duty to establish what that is.

12

Counsel this morning and by stipulation we're going to submit

13

to the Court the tax assessment, which puts the value at

14

I've marked this as Exhibit 1 —

15

I've talked to

—

$200,099.

Now, the reason for that is somewhat important.

16

Number 1, there is case law that says that if the amount of

17

the homestead exemption is below the value of what might be

18

received out of the house

—

19

THE COURT: You're not able tc sell it.

20

MR. WHITE: —

21

THE COURT: That is the one exception.

you're not able to sell it.
That is not the

22

case here.

The homestead exemption is $40,000; 20 for each.

23

The value of the home, according to that recent tax thing —

24

think that's a little high —

25

ample equity or value in the house to sell it.

is over —

is $200,000.

we

There is
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Let me continue with the Gilroy case.

This Court

2

stated that when a claim of homestead is made, a judgment

3

creditor is entitled —

4

value constituting the homestead right.

5

my clients —

to any excess above the

Furthermore, the homestead exemption is not a bar to

6

execution in the present case.

Assignee Federal Leasing, Inc.

7

bid in $100,000 of the judgment against the appellants and paid

8

to the sheriff on behalf of the appellants the $8,000 that was

9

their homestead exemption.

10

The Court ruled correctly that appellants were not

11

entitled to claim the protection of the homestead exemption

12

to set aside the execution of the sale.

13

This is the ruling.

14

overturned.

15

This is the case.

This is a good case.

It's never been

It's a 1981 case.

The only thing that's been modified in that statute,

16

according to my research, your Honor, is how to calculate what

17

the exemptions were.

18

is simply limited to bankruptcy.

19

I found no case that would say that this

Frankly, even in bankruptcy once the exemption is

20

fixed, the property is abandoned, they sell it, with the

21

proceeds going back into the estate —

22

that, but,they're exempt for the creditor.

23

well, I shouldn't say

So even under Counsel's argument of dealing with this

24

differently, that should not work in this Court, because that's

25

not what the law says.
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The physical structure itself is only exempt from

2

execution of sale unless it is worth less than what the

3

exemption amount is, and in this case that is simply not the

4

case.

5

the Court

6
7

Looking at the proposed order that I have submitted to
—
THE COURT: Hang on, let me get that so that I'm

looking at it with you.

8

MR. WHITE: Okay.

9

THE COURT: Order on motion to determine homestead

10
11

exemption; is that what it's entitled?
MR. WHITE: It says, "Order on hearing on writ of

12

execution granting homestead exemption" submitted September 22.

13

Has findings and conclusions on it.

14

THE COURT: I have it.

15

MR. WHITE: Going back a couple of months the defendant

16 I submitted some other objections, which frankly a few of those I
17

did incorporate into the current order before the Court, but

18

the last round that he submitted, as far as I can tell, did not

19

address anything further in the order, but rather argued, "You

20

can't sell the structure."

21

right now.

22

So I think that's where we're at

We would ask the Court to sign the order.

I_ believe

23

it comports with what the Court has said.

24

has objections that can state to the Court at this time of why

25

certain paragraphs should not be in there, we would like to get

Unless Mr. Miller
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this order signed.

2

We believe that my clients are entitled to whatever

3

proceeds there are over $40,000, and when we were here before,

4

Mr. Miller I believe agreed that ~he other little piece of

5

property was —

6

today it shouldn't be, but the Cojrt ordered it sold before.

7

There was not a homestead on it.

8

relationship, and we would submit: it based upon that.

9
10

could be sold.

Now I hear Counsel arguing

That is in the order m

that

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, ijst a few minutes for
rebuttal?

11

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

12

MR. PITTS: The case than Counsel —

plaintiff's

13

Counsel relies on, Gilroy versus Lowe, for setting out the law,

14

we believe in this situation may be distinguished, your Honor.

15

The language that plaintiff's Counsel set before the Court did

16

include the language m

17

sale of the home.

18

this case, m

terms of allowing the

We believe that in Gilroy versus Lowe there was

—

19

the facts of that case distinguish it from this one m

20

it was brought up entirely as a aefense in that situation; the

21

homestead exemption from the sale, and there were no —

22

was no protection.

23

that

there

There was no family to protect.

The justification in raising the defense wasn't

24

according to the statutory language, and the earlier case law

25

language that held that the reason in a Constitutional setting
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that the home should be protected from forced sale is to

2

protect those of the family that's at home, to allow them to

3

stay there.

4

didn't apply to this situation.

5

We believe that in the Gilroy setting that that

My client is iaising this as an argument for his

6

children, for the best interests of his children.

I dare say

7

that in this proceeding that they not only have an interest

8

this proceeding in terms of this home being sold because of

9

their livelihood, the place where they live.

m

It's possible

10

that they might be able to find an apartment or they may be

11

able to find some other place to live within the area, but I

12

can't see m

13

children cannot be taken into consideration when looking at the

14

forced sale of this structure.

15

this proceeding how the best interests of the

Also, I understand that since a homestead exemption

16

has been granted to the defendant's spouse, the defendant's

17

spouse is not represented here as a part of this proceeding,

18

and under Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of —

19

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure she would be an indispensable

20

party to the order of the forced sale or allowing the executior

21

on this property, because of her interest that's been granted.

22

I'm sorry, 19 of tie

In other situations where there is an interest that

23

has been granted, I understand that the procedure used to

24

be that the interest of the defendant had been sold in the

25

property in those situations, but not the actual structure, ana
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that the minor children were allowed to live in the structure

2

until the time that they reached the age of majority.

3

those rights come from a Constitutional Right in the property.

4

That's —

5

All of

and that further supports our argument.
Now, in the McMurty versus Chugg that we're relying

6

on also has language, your Honor, that we believe supports

7

and bolsters our point as much as the Gilroy case supports

8

plaintiff's Counsel.

9

In McMurty/Chugg it lays out the language, "The Court

10

rules that the head of a family may assert to prevent sale

11

under execution of his homestead at any time before the sale

12

of the premises, unless the claim against such property has

13

been previously asserted and actually adjudicated against him."

14

In that situation it actually talks, your Honor, and

15

uses language that not just the exemption he may exert against,

16

but he may assert to prevent the sale under execution of the

17

entire structure.

18

Your Honor, we really honestly believe in this

19

situation that although this may be a case of first impression

20

before this Court for at least 40 or 50 years, that this is rhe

21

path that this ought to take.

22

a Constitutional consideration along the due process line fcr

23

property rights, and should not —

24

those.

25

That this case ought to receive

that homestead falls under

We cite the Kimball case.
We cite the Utah State Constitution, that this is a
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Constitutional creation.

2

money that has evolved and come somehow.

3

Constitution.

4

relationships.

5

We assert that this is a case where we should go back to those

6

roots.

7

Homestead simply isn't a mechanism of
It has its roots in

It doesn't have its roots in creditor/debtor
It doesn't have its roots in bankruptcy law.

That we should go ahead and split the doctrine at this

8

time on homestead.

That there should be a line pertaining to

9

those that declare bankruptcy, and that those are entitled only

10

to keep the exemptions that they claim, and that those who do

11

not declare bankruptcy should be considered outside of that

12

scope, and that there is another body of law that this Court

13

should consider in that situation, and that my defend —

14

the defendant's rights fall in that situation in this case,

15

in order to protect his family, to protect his interest in

16

his property, to protect his minor children in their best

17

interests, and that this Court should not allow the forced

18

sale, but should come up with a more creative solution in this

19

situation that would allow my client, the defendant, to retain

20

possession of his home.

21

THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, Counsel.

that

It appears

22

from the plain reading of the statute that the exemption has a

23

cap, and I see nothing in the order proposed by Counsel that

24

appears objectionable.

25

than really reconsideration of the argument once provided by

Nor have I heard any argument other
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Mr. Miller in some time past associated with exception to the

2

order itself.

3

Certainly rne consequences associated with a number

4

of activities that take place in debtor/creditor relationships

5

accrue to the detriment of the parties who have the debt.

6

is one of those circumstances, and the legislature has made

7

clear that that h -esuead exemption doesn't create an enviable

8

castle, but it creates an enviable castle up to a certain

9

interest amount.

10

This

That interest amount is specifically set forth in the

11

statute, and the Gilroy case seems to be apparent on its face

12

to be applicable to this very case, and that is simply that

13

forced sales may take place of a homestead exemption, with the

14

homestead simply being the amount carved out and any potential

15

equity m

16

the home thar's not available for attachment.
Accordingly I'll grant the order.

I think I have it

17

here, but if you have a new one, I have one that's m

18

and I'll sign it tcaay.

19
20

So this concludes this issue.

MR. WHITE: I only have my copy, your Honor.
think it's an original.

my file

I don't

If not, I'll bring one up today.

21

THE COURT: Well, let's see if it is.

22

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, for the record, defense Counsel

23
24
25

would like to object.
THE COURT: Yean, I took that by way of your argument
that you were objecting.
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2
3

MR. PITTS: Sure, I'm j u s t p r e s e r v i n g t h e r e c o r d ,
Honor.
THE COURT: All right.

I can take this out.

I'm not

4

sure that it' s an original either, but —

5

of the order.

6

to do with it.

7

value that exists in excess of the homestead exemption.

8

Court's in recess,

9
10 I

11

your

okay, here' s a copy

You may certify it or whatever else ycu need
The Exhibit No. 1 has been received as to the

MR. WHITE: Thank you, your Honor.
(Hearing concluded.
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m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
)
HOUGHTON, KENDALLR. THOMAS, )
MARLENETHOMAS, and the 1995
)l
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,
]1
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER ON HEARING ON WRIT OF
EXECUTION GRANTING HOMESTEAD
EXEMPTION

]
]

GLEN E. MILLER,

)
)

Civil No;i000301127
Judge Randall Skanchy

Defendant

The Defendant's Motion for Hearing on Writ of Execution before the Honorable Randall N.
Skanchy, Judge, on the 4th day of August, 2003; the Defendant, Glen E. Miller, was personally
^present and represented himself; the Plaintiffs were all personally present and represented by
Douglas R-White, Attorney; and good cause appearing, therefore the Court enters the following
Order:

1

FINDINGS
1.

A prejudgment Writ of Attachment was filed against the real property in question and

was granted on March 26, 2001.
2.

A judgment was entered on April 10,2003 against Glen E. Miller in this matter.

3.

Lori Miller, the wife of the Defendant, filed a declaration of homestead on the subj ect

property on March 26,2003, and she either took occupancy of the property in March or May of 2003.
4.

A Writ of Execution was issued on May 1,2003; and a sale of the property, subject

to execution, was scheduled for July 23, 2003.
5.

Defendant filed a request for hearing on the Writ of Execution, and the Court ordered

a stay of execution, pending hearing on July 22,2003. The matter was continued until August 4,
2003.
6.

The prejudgment Writ of Attachment was filed against the two (2) real properties at

anime when Defendant did not occupy either property as his residence, nor did any member of his
family.
7.

On March 26,2001, when the prejudgment Writ of Attachment became a lien against

the following described two (2) parcels of real property, the Defendant's and his family's primary
residence was 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah, which is not either of the two (2) real properties
subject to this action:
PARCEL NO 1:
Beginning 3OTfeet South of the Northwest Corner of Block 26,
Plat A, Tooele City Survey, running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet;
thence West 9feet; thence North 181.5feet; ihenct West 495feet; thence North 66 5
2

feet to point of beginning. Containing 0.77 acres. Parcel No. 02-42-14.
PARCEL NO. 2:
Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast Corner of Lot 5,
Block 41, Plat A, Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, running thence West 196.96feet;
thence North 43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 43.5 feet to the point
of beginning. Containing 0.20 acres. Parcel No. 2-57-27.
8.

Defendant was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison on March 27,2002. Thereafter,

Defendant's wife started to repair the uninhabitable house (Parcel No. 1) to live in, and moved in
approximately March o* May of 2003. The prejudgment lien was taken against Parcel No. 1 on
March 26,2001.
9.

Thereafter, Defendant lost his primary residence, that being 891 Upland Drive,

Tooele, Utah^through a mortgage foreclosure in approximately December 2002.
10r

Parcel No. 1, on March 26, 2001,-was an old uninhabitable rental house that was

vacant and had had no renters in it for some time.
11.

Parcel No. 2 is vacant ground, has no residence on it, and produces no income or

support to the Defendant's family.
12.

There are no mortgages against either parcel of real property.
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS

13.

The prejudgment Writ of Attachment, filed on March 26, 2001, is defeated by the

filing of a homestead declaration on March 26,2003.
14?

The amount of homesteadjexemption is $20,000.00 for Glen E. Miller and $20,000.00

for Lori L. Miller, pursuant to Section 78-23-3(2), U.C.A. as against Parcel No. 1.

3

12.

Parcel No. 2 has no homestead exemption.

13.

The Plaintiffs shall renotice the Sheriffs Sale, which was previously stayed by the

Court, and proceed with the sale of both parcels of real property, subject to this Order.
DATED this _ 4 l day of JXct^hen

2003.
BY THE COURT

RANDALL SKANCHT
Judge

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT

TO:

GLEN E.MILLER
Pursuant to Rule 4.504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the

undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is
mailed to you to allow you sufficient time to file any written objections to the form of the foregoing
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form are filed within that
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing.
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on
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this 22nd day of September, 2003, to the following person(s):
Glen E. Miller, USP No. 33042
Defendant
Utah State Prison
P. 0. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

Q£Ai

SON, Legal Assistant
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DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive
Bounti&l, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 652-0016
FAX: (801)296-1754

FILED

* D DISTRICT COURT TOOELE

01 APR 17 AH K): 1*8
FILED BY.

Fee:

18.00 Cash

CALLEEN B. PESHELL, Recorder

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL

LfcS F
TOOELE COUNTY CORPORATION

TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
HOUGHTON,KENDALLR. THOMAS,
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF
ATTACHMENT
'TATEOFFTAH
)
CODNH OF TOOELE) ss

mat appears of record in tlw offke of ihv fooele Co-mrv Pecorcter

vs.

^ ^ yyfc WitneM Mv fl'n.d \*id Seal

GLEN E. MILLER,
Judge David S. Young

***-*

Defendants.
The Plaintiffs' Motion for a Prejudgment Writ of Attachment came before the Court on the
26th day of March, 2001, before the Honorable David S. Young, Judge; the Plaintiffs were present
and represented by their attorney, Douglas F. White; the Defendant was not personally present, but
was represented by his attorney, Gregory P. Hawkins; the Court having reviewed the pleadings and
the evidence by proffer of the attorneys, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the
following Order:
1.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment against the following

described parcels of real property is hereby granted:

,

E 1 6 4 9 0 6

BOG87

P 0 0 2 2

Parcel No. 1. All of Lot 1, Oak View Heights #4, a subdivision of Tooele City.
Serial No. 10-8-C-l
Parcel No. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast corner of Lot 5, Block 41,
Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, running thence West 196.96 feet;
thence North 43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 43.5
feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-57-27
Parcel No. 3: Beginning 303 feet, more or less, South of the Northwest comer of
Block 26, Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, said point of
beginning bring the Southwest corner of the Hawker property; and
running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet; thence West 9
feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence West 495 feet; thence North
66.5 feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-42-14
2.

The Court orders that any and all interest, right and title of Glen E. Miller in the

above-described properties be attached. The Defendant is restrained from transferring his interest
to another in anyway.
3.

A Writ of Attachment is hereby authorized by this Court pursuant to Rule 64(c) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
4.

The Court orders that in lieu of requiring a bond be set, that the Plaintiffs will appear

before the Court, upon motion of the Defendant or others, as the case may be, from time to time
during the period of this Writ of Attachment, for the purpose of determining whether the Writ of
Attachment should continue based upon the Defendant's circumstances.
DATED this

day of April, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

DAVID S.YdUNG]
Third Distrfct Court Aidgi

2

E1 6 4 9 0 6

B0 6 8 7

P 0 0 2 3

NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY
TO:

Gregory P. Hawkins
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the

undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is
mailed to you to allow you sufiBcient time to file any written objections to the form of the foregoing
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form arefiledwithin that
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing.
I do hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing, postage prepaid, on this
ffi^Qay of March, 2001, to the following person(s):

Gregory P. Hawkins
Attorney for Defendant
136 South Main Street, 6* Floor
Salt lake City, Utah 84115

(Lhart—»
JUD^ETEgSON
Legal Assistant
I CERTIFY THAI THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE INTOETHIRO
OISTRICT COURT. TOOELE COUNTY. STATE
OF UTAH s\
t{
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ADDENDUM 15
The question of jurisdiction was raised because the issues raised in this cross appeal were
to a post-judgment order dated August 7, 2003 (Addendum 9). It appears that any objections to
that order should have been raised within the 30-day time period allotted by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure for post-judgment motions. See Cahoon v. Cahoon. 641 P.2d 140 (Utah
1982) where the Utah Supreme Court said, "The final judgment rule does not preclude review of
post judgment orders; such orders were independently subject to the test of finality, according to
their own substance and effect." Where the real issue before the court at the hearing on August
4, 2003, was whether or not Miller's property qualified for a homestead exemption (Addendum
1, page 410). The order and ruling dated August 7, 2003, decided the issue against Houghtons
and Thomas' and granted the homestead exemption to Miller. "[T]he fact that the court retained
jurisdiction to adjudicate further matters [such as whether a homestead was subject to a forced
sale] did not leave open for reconsideration the question as to [whether Miller qualified for a
homestead exemption], and the decree entered was final and appealable, and became conclusive
in the absence of a timely appeal." In re Vorhees' Estate 12 Utah 2d. 361. 366 P.2d 977 (1961).
Houghtons and Thomas' did not file a notice to appeal these issues until December 30, 2003.
(Addendum 1, Pages 538-539). Timeliness of their appeal is questioned.
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DETERMINATIVE LAWS
1. Constitution of UTAH, Article XXII Section 1:
'The Legislature shall provide by statute for an exemption of a homestead which may
consist of one or more parcels of lands, together with the appurtenances and improvements
thereon from sale on execution."
2. UTAH CODE SECTION 78-23-3(2)fc):
"A person may claim a homestead exemption in one or more parcels of real property
together with appurtenances and improvements."
3. UTAH CODE SECTION 78-23-3(3):
"A homestead is exempt from judicial lien and from levy, execution, or forced sale
except for:
(a) statutory liens for property taxes and assessments on property;
(b) security interests in the property and judicial liens for debts created for the purchase
price of the property;
(c) judicial liens obtained on debts created by failure to provide support or maintenance
for dependent children; and
(d) consensual liens obtained on debts created by mutual contract."
4. UTAH CODE SECTION 78-23-3(5)0)):
"The proceeds of any sale to the amount of the homestead exemption existing at time of
sale, is exempt from levy, execution, or other process for one year after the receipt of the
proceeds by the person entitled to the exemption."

5. UTAH CODE SECTION 78-23-3(6):
'The sale and disposition of one homestead does not prevent the selection or purchase of
another."
6. UTAH CODE SECTION 78-23-4:
u

An individual may select and claim a homestead by complying with the following

requirements:
(1) Filing a signed and acknowledged declaration of homestead with the recorder of the
county or counties in which the homestead claimant's property is located or serving a
signed and acknowledged declaration of homestead upon the sheriff or other officer
conducting an execution prior to the time stated in the notice of such execution."

